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IT IS OfTEN CHALLENGING TO fIND A CASE STUDY  
fOr A LESSON in military leadership and ethics 
involving the law of armed conflict (LOAC) for 
which the facts and documentation are sufficient 
to appeal to ethicists, historians, and lawyers. It is 
likewise challenging to find such a case study in 
which company-grade officers are unequivocally 
presented with an illegal order by a field-grade 
commander and demonstrate dramatically 
different responses to the same order in the same 
situational context. Finally, it is difficult to find 
these circumstances in the context of regular 
units, composed of ordinary soldiers, going 
about their military duties. The experiences of 
the 1st Battalion, 691st Infantry Regiment, of the 
German Wehrmacht (armed forces), performing 
rear-area security duties in the first week of 
October 1941 in occupied Belarus, meet these 
stringent requirements.
The Wehrmacht as an organization was deeply 
complicit in the Nazi genocidal project. It 
supported the mass murder of Jews and other 
perceived racial enemies in the east partly by 
providing for the logistics and movement of the 
Einsatzgruppen, or mobile killing squads. In some 
instances, it also provided the manpower for actual 
killing operations. Recent scholarship continues to 
unearth the myriad ways in which the Wehrmacht 
supported the Nazi genocidal project; however, 
the extent to which Wehrmacht units participated 
in the “Final Solution” remains somewhat unclear. 
Some units, because of their location and function, 
were not involved in the same way, and some 
simply chose to not participate. Some units, 
however, engaged in actual executions of Jewish 
civilians, rather than just providing security or 
logistical support. The 1st Battalion, 691st Infantry 
Regiment, was such a unit. 
On or about October 7, 1941, the battalion 
commander ordered his three company 
commanders to kill all the Jewish civilians in 
their respective areas of operation. One company 
commander complied immediately; the second 
reportedly refused; and the third tried to ignore 
the order, but when it was issued in writing, he 
directed the company first sergeant to conduct 
the shootings and retreated to his office. Because 
a German court investigated and then tried the 
third company commander and first sergeant 
for murder relatively soon after World War II, 
the events of early October 1941 are detailed 
and recorded to a degree not ordinarily seen 
at the small-unit level. Judicial documents 
provide a rich source of eyewitness testimony 
from battalion officers and soldiers concerning 
not only the facts of the shootings but also the 
emotional and psychological reactions of the 
Wehrmacht service members. 
Because the unit was performing rear-area 
security duties before the Soviet partisan 
campaign had begun, the case study is not 
complicated by perceptions and decisions 
made in the heat of combat, such as those 
occurring at the front; it is, however, influenced 
by a Wehrmacht institutional attitude toward 
treatment of civilians in war. As the case study 
explores leadership at various levels, military 
professionals today will likely see the actions of 
the 1st Battalion officers and soldiers as relevant 
to their perspectives and concerns about 
leadership—regardless of their rank.
The lesson may be adapted as necessary by 
instructors to fit both the time allowed and the 
subjects to be addressed. Instructors may choose 
from options provided, which address ethical 
and legal points raised by the case study. Option 
A uses the Army Regulation 15–6 format for 
conducting investigations. This format allows 
participants to put themselves in the position of 
investigating officers (IOs) tasked not just with 
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explaining what happened but why it happened 
and how it might be prevented in the future. 
The study questions in Option B consider rules 
of engagement and the law of armed conflict 
and lend themselves to small-group work, 
depending on the size of the group and the time 
available. These questions are designed to allow 
participants to approach ethical and legal aspects 
of the case study from specific perspectives, 
thereby providing a platform for discussions 
on leadership. Option C’s Peer-to-Peer format 
provides the opportunity for participants 
to engage in high levels of simultaneous 
communication simulating the challenges of 
leadership and conflict in a cyber environment. 
Each option provides military professionals and 
civilian students with a context within which 
they may begin to understand the importance of 
the tasks given to the military under Presidential 
Study Directive 10 (August 4, 2011) to prevent and 
respond to mass atrocities today.
Resources are provided for instructors who wish 
to go further in depth in their instruction. The 
short documentary The Path to Nazi Genocide, 
created by the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, explores the Nazis’ ideology, 
propaganda, and persecution of Jews and other 
victims. It also outlines the path by which the 
Nazis and their collaborators led a state to war 
and to the murder of millions of people. The 
short film The Role of the German Army during the 
Holocaust features historian Geoffrey Megargee, 
who provides context on the changing nature 
and role of the Wehrmacht. Translated copies of 
the state court decision in the case involving the 
third company commander and the first sergeant 
and Nazi high-command directives supply 
additional material useful for deeper discussion 
of the study questions.
We hope you find this lesson as useful and as 
interesting to teach as we have. It lends itself to 
collaborative teaching and has proven to be a 
useful complement to instruction on the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice. We are available to 
discuss the lesson and our experiences teaching it, 
and we invite other instructors who conduct the 
lesson to let us know what they found useful and 
what they suggest to improve it.
COL JODY prESCOTT (rET.)
Dr. wAITmAN wADE BEOrN 
JENNIfEr CIArDELLI 
Dr. DAvID frEY 
GrETCHEN SkIDmOrE
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Opposite: Suspected partisans sit on the ground with 
German officers and soldiers in the background, Soviet 




Commanders often confront complex situations 
in which the imperatives of leadership intertwine 
with considerations of personal and professional 
ethics and the law. Using the case study of one 
Wehrmacht2 battalion—1st Battalion, 691st 
Infantry Regiment—on the eastern front in World 
War II, this lesson examines the chain of events 
that led to the mass killings of Jewish civilians in 
the battalion’s area of operations (AO) in October 
1941. These events, when considered within the 
context of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), provide 
a platform for today’s military professionals 
to think critically about their obligations as 
members of the military. The aim of this study 
is to provide military personnel an opportunity 
to weave understandings of ethics and law into 
their own developing leadership styles and to 
understand how, in the context of a particular war 
and particular military culture, protected civilians 
were transformed into military targets.3
In this case study, three commanders had three 
different responses to the same illegal order to 
kill civilians in the same AO. To explore these 
responses from a leadership perspective and to 
determine how these historical events at the 
small-unit level are relevant for US military 
personnel today, this lesson focuses on the 
actions of the commander and first sergeant 
of 3rd Company, 1st Battalion. Against this 
backdrop, participants identify and explain 
the basic principles of LOAC, and they analyze 
the company commanders’ actions specifically 
in the context of command responsibility and 
obedience to orders. Using the principles of 
LOAC that were reaffirmed in the post-World 
War II trials of Nazi war criminals before US 
Army tribunals and codified in the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949, participants 
will discuss the legal and ethical standards US 
military professionals are expected to meet, 
the challenges military leaders face in making 
consistently legal and ethical decisions in a 
combat theater, and the consequences of failure 
to meet these standards.
II. Occupied Belarus,  
 October 1941
From the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, 
the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 
1941, Wehrmacht units engaged in the forced 
ghettoization of Jewish civilians, used Jews for 
forced labor, and conducted reprisal killings 
against Jews in the newly occupied Soviet 
territories.4 Two orders likely facilitated these 
actions. First, the May 13, 1941, Barbarossa 
Jurisdiction Order suspended most courts-
martial for German soldiers committing 
punishable offenses against civilians in the east.5 
Second, the May 19, 1941, Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht (OKW) “Directives for the Behavior 
of the Troops in Russia” reminded soldiers that 
“this struggle requires ruthless and energetic 
action against Bolshevik agitators, guerillas, 
saboteurs, and Jews and the total elimination 
of all active or passive resistance.”6 With this 
order, the Wehrmacht drew on a military 
legacy of ruthless treatment of enemy civilian 
populations and on antisemitic stereotypes that 
falsely associated Judaism with Communism.7 
As German forces advanced rapidly through the 
Soviet Union, they found themselves occupying 
vast rural and undeveloped areas. This created 
vulnerable communications zones through 
which supply trains and reinforcements had 
to pass to reach the rapidly advancing German 
front lines. Even as it sought to secure logistical 
routes, the military supported other agencies 
of the Nazi state, especially the SS, in beginning 
the wholesale murder of Jews in the service of 
larger racist agendas.8 In cooperation with units 
of the SS, the Waffen SS (military SS),9 and the 
police apparatus (including the Security Police, 
Sicherheitspolizei or Sipo, and the Security Service, 
Sicherheitsdienst or SD),10 and with the assistance 
of local collaborators, the Wehrmacht conducted 
shooting operations to kill unarmed Jewish and 
non-Jewish civilians. 
Army Group Center (Rear), known by its German 
abbreviation rHGM, occupied most of modern-
day Belarus (see fig. 1) and was commanded 
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them to kill all Jews in their respective AOs.14 
The commander of 1st Company, 47-year-old 
World War I veteran and Nazi Party member 
First Lieutenant Josef Sibille, reportedly 
refused the order outright. The commander 
of 2nd Company, 33-year-old First Lieutenant 
Hermann Kuhls, was both a Nazi Party and an 
SS member and considered by his troops to be 
“radical,” “anti-religious,” and an outspoken 
antisemite; he complied and began shootings 
immediately.15 The commander of 3rd Company, 
Captain Friedrich Nöll, was viewed by some 
of his troops as strict but by others as weak, 
indecisive, and more inclined to lead from his 
desk than from the front.16 Nöll, who like Sibille 
was a World War I veteran, hesitated at first 
to carry out the order; eventually, however, 
he directed his company’s first sergeant, Emil 
Zimber, to instruct his soldiers to carry out the 
executions.
III. The mogilev Conference
Before Operation Barbarossa commenced, 
the Wehrmacht concluded a memorandum 
of agreement with the SS that allowed 
Einsatzgruppen, or mobile killing units,17 to 
operate in the Army group rear areas.18 During 
the first six months of the invasion, SS and 
police units, including the Einsatzgruppen, shot 
and killed approximately 778,000 people, the 
vast majority of whom were Jewish civilians.19 
Wehrmacht commanders on the eastern front 
cooperated extensively with the Einsatzgruppen, 
especially in matters of perceived partisan 
activity against their forces.20 Casualty figures 
for the units composing rHGM suggest that 
fairly little organized partisan activity occurred 
on the part of bypassed Red Army formations or 
Soviet citizens in the rHGM AO well into late fall 
1941;21 despite the lack of any evidence, German 
commanders began focusing on a partisan threat. 
This obsession—or even paranoia—allowed the 
Wehrmacht commanders, with SS assistance, to 
conflate “antipartisan” actions with “anti-Jewish” 
actions.22 SS and other Nazi leaders also seemed 
intent on leveraging the manpower and resources 
Major Alfred Commichau, Commander, 1st 
Battalion, from personnel file. Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv Pers6-11125
by General Max von Schenckendorff, whose 
headquarters were in Mogilev.11 The German 
front lines were approximately 150 kilometers 
east of von Schenckendorff ’s AO. His forces 
included the 339th Infantry Division, which 
had been formed in Thüringen in central 
Germany in 1940 (see fig. 2).12 The 339th had 
performed occupation duties in France’s Loire 
Valley between May and August 1941. In early 
September the 339th moved to the eastern 
front and officially assumed rear-area security 
duties in rHGM on September 19, 1941. One of 
the division’s components, the 691st Infantry 
Regiment, directed its 1st Battalion to establish 
its headquarters near the small Belarusian town 
of Krugloye. The 691st had been originally 
created out of a fortress infantry regiment.13 
First Battalion’s three maneuver companies 
were dispersed among other small towns in the 
Krugloye area; 3rd Company, for example, was 
based in the village of Krucha.
On or about October 7, 1941, the 1st Battalion’s 
commander, Major Alfred Commichau, issued 
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Figure 1. Eastern Europe, 1941. Advance on Moscow: 
Operation Barbarossa. October 1941. West Point 
Department of History Cartography Center. Inset: Mogilev 
oblast location map, Dimitrius, Share Alike 3.0 Unported. 
Location titles by US Holocaust Memorial Museum.
of the Wehrmacht to support their goal of 
murdering Jews, political commissars, and other 
perceived enemies of the state. In so doing, army 
units became complicit in the mass murder of 
unarmed civilians, both Jewish and non-Jewish. 
On September 24, 1941, General von 
Schenckendorff convened a conference of 
his subordinate commanders and other unit 
representatives at rHGM headquarters in 
Mogilev, Belarus, to discuss antipartisan 
operations.23 Von Schenckendorff set the tone 
of the conference by stating at the outset that 
“townspeople will be used [by the partisans] 
as guides, scouts, and informants. Particularly 
the elderly, women, and adolescents because 
they are least suspicious, will be utilized for 
reconnaissance.”24 Following his introduction, 
commanders at a variety of echelons, including 
General Bach-Zelewski, the Higher SS and Police 
Leader for rHGM (or as abbreviated in German, 
HSSPF),25 and Colonel Hermann Fegelein,26 
the commander of an SS cavalry brigade, gave a 
series of 15-minute lessons-learned presentations. 
General Arthur Nebe, who commanded one of 
the four SS Einsatzgruppen, gave a presentation 
that focused on three main areas. First, he 
addressed the need for greater cooperation 
between Wehrmacht units and the SD; second, he 
discussed the selection and employment of local 
collaborators; and third—and most ominously—
he took up the “Jewish Question,” with particular 
focus on the partisan movement.27 The briefings 
were followed by a demonstration by military 
police on how to occupy a village. 
The next morning, September 25, the exchange 
of experiences continued with an SS cavalry 
regiment commander leading off, followed by 
short classes and sand-table exercises conducted 
by various company-grade officers on tactical 
12
level antipartisan subjects.28 In the afternoon, 
the conference participants traveled to a village 
near Mogilev to watch a military police company 
conduct a village search. The company was 
supported by a 16-man SD detachment. Unable 
to find any identifiable partisans, the German 
forces instead shot 13 Jewish men and 19 Jewish 
women. The conference concluded the next 
day with the observation of another operation 
to ferret out Soviet partisans and political 
commissars.
The conference report was later distributed 
down to the company level throughout rHGM. 
In the report, General von Schenckendorff 
stated, “[t]he enemy must be completely 
annihilated... .The constant decision between life 
and death for partisans and suspicious persons 
is difficult even for the hardest soldier. It must 
be done. He acts correctly who fights ruthlessly 
and mercilessly with complete disregard for any 
personal surge of emotion.”29 Interestingly, Jews 
were not mentioned in the report at all. Most 
of those who read the report (including the 
postwar court) understood, however, that the 
purpose of the Mogilev conference was to serve 
as a catalyst for bringing rHGM and Wehrmacht 
formations in line with the Nazi push to kill 
all Jews in the occupied territories. Holocaust 
historian Raul Hilberg explained some of this 
complicity, writing that “the generals had eased 
themselves into this pose of cooperation through 
the pretense that the Jewish population was a 
group of Bolshevist diehards, who instigated, 
encouraged, and abetted the partisan war behind 
the German lines.”30 Not everyone was convinced, 
however. An inspector in the Army Economic and 
Armament Office in the Ukraine, for example, 
reported to his boss in December 1941 that “there 
is no proof that Jewry as a whole or even to a 
greater part was implicated in acts of sabotage.”31 
Indeed, a minority of Wehrmacht officers (and 
soldiers) recognized that the numbers of Jews 
active in the partisan movements began to grow 
after the murders of Jews had commenced. For 
officers and soldiers who may have been reluctant 
to kill women and children, on the other hand, 
connecting all Jews with an imagined anti-
partisan threat would have both partially allayed 
these concerns as well as lessened inhibitions 
by placing anti-Jewish actions in the context of 
“legitimate” combat operations.
Iv. 3rd Company  
 Executions in krucha
On or about October 7, 1941, the 3rd Company 
messenger brought a verbal order from battalion 
headquarters for 3rd Company to kill all Jews 
in its AO.32 Company leadership discussed the 
order, and Nöll, who allegedly was troubled 
by the order, decided to ignore it.33 A written 
order subsequently arrived, confirming the first 
order and signed by the battalion commander.34 
Nöll asked for volunteers to carry out the 
killings, but no one stepped forward.35 He then 
ordered Zimber to carry out the order. Zimber 
assembled a platoon that had just returned from 
an overnight operation. When he read the order 
to them, the soldiers apparently responded with 
indignation. Zimber reacted to this by saying, 
“We can’t change anything. Orders are orders.”36 
He then divided the men into three details: 
shooting, guarding, and evacuation and cordon. 
Local police collaborators also assisted.37
The evacuation detail began rounding up the 
village’s Jews and led them to a small square, 
where the guarding detail took control.38  
Groups of four or five Jews were then taken  
to a predetermined execution site in the forest, 
which was only about 200 meters from the 
village.39 Importantly, Zimber positioned himself 
at the shooting site and oversaw the pairing 
of two German soldiers per Jewish civilian to 
constitute the execution detail.40 Because the 
executions took place so close to the village, the 
Jews in the square heard the shots and screams. 
The Jews begged the soldiers not to shoot them, 
but their entreaties had no effect.41 After 114  
Jews had been executed, with Zimber apparently 
administering fatal shots to the ones who were 
merely wounded, the soldiers returned to their 
quarters.42 In addition to local police, other non-
Figure 2:  
339th Infantry 
Division Table 
of Organization  





Men with an unidentified unit execute a group of Soviet civilians kneeling by the side of a mass grave.  
Eastern front, circa June 1941–September 1941. US Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of National Archives  
and Records Administration
Jewish civilians apparently also participated, 
killing wounded Jews and haphazardly burying 
them. Afterward, they helped themselves to the 
possessions of the murdered Jews.43
At least a handful of soldiers apparently chose not 
to participate in the shootings, despite orders to 
do so. One soldier, Wilhelm Magel, found himself 
walking next to a sergeant who was also a doctor 
of theology. As they walked, they discussed how 
they might avoid being part of the shooting 
detail.44 Upon their arrival at the shooting site, 
Magel and the sergeant were paired up. As a local 
policeman yelled at the civilians to face away 
from the German soldiers, the sergeant asked 
Zimber whether they could be relieved from the 
detail. Zimber agreed that as soon as the next two 
soldiers arrived to relieve them, they could return 
to the guard detail in the square.45 Zimber then 
gave the order to fire, and Magel allegedly closed 
his eyes and did not aim as he fired. Apparently 
the theologian did the same, for their target 
remained standing, unwounded. Zimber then 
ordered a local policeman to shoot the Jewish 
civilian, and Magel and his partner returned to 
the square.46 Sergeant Leopold W.47 found out 
about the operation in advance and requested 
that Zimber relieve him from the shooting detail, 
stating that “this wasn’t my thing and there were 
enough people who would do this voluntarily.”48 
Zimber released him from the detail.
Upon returning to their quarters, the soldiers 
in the platoon were, in general, subdued. One 
soldier remembered that he “could read on the 
faces of my comrades that they detested this 
method of dealing with the Jews.”49 The company 
clerk presented a more differentiated analysis of 
the soldiers’ reactions. “Overall,” he testified later, 
“I had the impression that the larger part of the 
company carried out the order with reluctance 
and felt its rationale to be poor. However, there 
were also people who found the order, while 
brutal, necessary with regard to the experience 
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with the partisans.”50 Taking a different position, 
one soldier recalled that “the shooting was 
derided amongst the men because it had been 
people who had not fought and were only being 
shot because of their race.”51 The experience was 
both collective and deeply personal. One soldier 
explained, “We were all so shocked that as we 
sat down together that evening, hardly anything 
was said about the incident. In particular, no one 
related what he had personally done.”52
The soldiers of the 3rd Company demonstrated 
a wide variety of emotional reactions to this 
killing. The first and most common reaction was 
some form of shock. By all accounts, this type 
of operation was not something to which these 
men had been exposed, certainly not in the Loire 
Valley, where they were previously stationed. The 
men were upset, uneasy, and disgusted; however, 
the reasons for these reactions are varied and 
often unclear. For many of the soldiers, what 
had been done apparently just felt wrong. Some 
soldiers thought that this was not a job for 
the army or that the Jewish civilians were not 
legitimate targets. For others who participated 
more intimately in the killing, the violent scenes 
and physical revulsion were traumatic. Some 
of the men seem to have felt a sense of shame 
and denial because they did not wish to speak 
about or acknowledge what they had done. 
These emotional reactions do not by themselves 
signal disagreement with the policy in principle 
or an increased tendency to resist or evade 
participation; soldiers often have misgivings 
about killing. The reactions of these soldiers at 
the very least, however, indicate that the men 
were neither zealous killers nor numb to the 
gravity of the tasks they had completed. “If I was 
asked today,” one former soldier stated, “what 
my comrades said about the execution, I can only 
say that everyone back then said that they would 
never do something like that again.”53
In contrast, 1st Company refused to participate 
in the ordered killings. In a letter written to 
the senior civilian prosecutor trying Nöll’s and 
Zimber’s cases in German court several years 
after the war, Sibille stated that he had received 
a telephone call on or about October 7, 1941, 
from the battalion commander, directing him 
to kill all Jews in his AO.54 Sibille stated that 
Commichau had told him, “As long as the Jews 
are not eliminated, we will not have any peace 
from the partisans. The Jewish action in your area 
must therefore be completed in the end.”55 Sibille 
related that this order caused him “anxious hours 
and a sleepless night” until he made his decision. 
After repeated urgent calls from the battalion 
commander, Sibille informed Commichau that 
“my Company would not shoot any Jews, unless 
we catch the Jew with the opposing partisans.” 
He explained that he could not “expect decent 
German soldiers to dirty their hands with such 
things.”56 Commichau then asked Sibille when 
he would “be hard for once,” to which Sibille 
replied, “In this case, never.” Commichau then 
said, “Enough. You have three days to carry out 
this order.” Sibille again refused, saying he would 
never carry it out and that he would besmirch 
neither his honor nor that of his company.57
Although we know little about Sibille’s 
specific motivations beyond his statements to 
Commichau, suggestions from Sibille’s family 
indicated that his refusal to follow the order 
was not based only upon professionalism but 
also reflected a deeper moral objection based 
in part on religious grounds.58 Further, not only 
Former First Lieutenant Josef Sibille, after the war. 
Courtesy of Richard and Christiane Sibille
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was Sibille at age 47 a mature first lieutenant, he 
was also a World War I veteran who had fought 
on the western front.59 Other than an apparent 
assessment by his fellow officers in the battalion 
that he was too soft, Sibille apparently suffered 
no further repercussions from his refusal to obey 
the execution order.60
That Sibille was not penalized for his decision 
was surprisingly typical for those German officers 
and soldiers who chose not to comply with 
orders to shoot Jewish civilians. In one analysis 
of 85 documented cases in which Wehrmacht, 
SS, or police service members refused to shoot 
Jews or Soviet prisoners of war (POWs), 49 
experienced no consequences.61 Of the others, 
some suffered multiple but minor repercussions; 
for example, 15 were reprimanded, 14 were 
transferred, five were investigated, and three 
were sent to combat units at the front, but only 
one was imprisoned.62 First Lieutenant Nikolaus 
Hornig, a Wehrmacht officer serving in a police 
battalion in Poland in November 1941, refused 
his battalion commander’s order to participate 
in the execution of 780 Soviet POWs.63 Hornig 
not only said no, he also explained to his troops 
that the order was illegal. In his defense, he 
consistently cited Article 47 of the Military Penal 
Code.64 He was later tried before SS and police 
courts on charges of disobeying orders and, more 
importantly, undermining the fighting spirit of 
his troops—the offense of Wehrkraftzersetzung.65 
He was convicted only of the latter charge and 
consequently held in Buchenwald concentration 
camp under a form of investigative arrest 
until the end of the war because the SS head, 
Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, did not sign off 
on the sentence of seven years’ imprisonment. 
Despite his detention, Hornig kept his rank and 
continued to draw his pay.66
v. postwar Trial
Long after these events, Nöll and Zimber were 
brought to trial in front of a German civilian 
criminal court for their roles in the murder of the 
Jewish civilians. A first trial resulted in sentences 
of four years’ imprisonment for Nöll and three 
years for Zimber. After a retrial, both Nöll and 
Zimber were convicted of being accessories to at 
least 15 deliberate killings.67 The Darmstadt State 
Court concluded:
A soldier in the performance of his duty 
is only then criminally responsible, as a 
participant, in the execution of an illegal 
command under Article 47, Subsection 1, 
Number 2 of the Military Criminal Code if 
he knows that the command of the superior 
concerned an action whose object is a 
general or military crime or offense. Under 
this provision, the Military Criminal Code, 
which, despite its repeal by the [Allied] 
Control Council. . . ,  is to be applied [here] 
since it was valid law at the time of the crime 
(Article 2, Subsection 2 of the Criminal 
Code), responsibility for an official order, 
which if followed would result in a violation 
of criminal law, belongs exclusively to the 
commanding superior. The subordinate may 
obey [without penalty] as long as he was 
not aware of the non-binding nature of the 
command because of its criminal purpose. 
But should the subordinate realize that the 
superior intended the commission of a crime as a 
result of his order, he must refuse to carry out this 
illegal order. Otherwise, he faces punishment 
as a participant [in the crime].68
Nöll and Zimber, State Court Darmstadt, March 9, 1956. 
ullstein bild/The Granger Collection, New York 
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The Darmstadt court therefore confirmed the 
trial court’s findings but reduced the sentences 
that the trial court had given after a second 
trial—namely, a reduction in Nöll’s sentence 
from four to three years and Zimber’s from three 
to two years.69
vI. killing in Context: The  
 Basic principles of LOAC
The United States recognizes four key principles 
of LOAC: military necessity, or military objective; 
distinction, or discrimination; proportionality; 
and humanity, or avoiding unnecessary 
suffering. mILITArY NECESSITY justifies those 
measures not forbidden by international law 
that are indispensable for securing the complete 
submission of the enemy as quickly as possible.70 
Military necessity was defined originally in the 
Civil War-era Lieber Code as follows: “those 
measures which are indispensable for securing 
the ends of war, and which are lawful according 
to the modern laws and usages of war.”71 As just 
stated, the definition has two elements: there 
must be a military requirement to undertake the 
action, and the action itself must not be unlawful 
under LOAC. As settled at the war crimes trials 
in Nuremberg, Germany, after World War II, 
military necessity cannot ever be so great that 
it overcomes the need to conform to LOAC.72 
A subtle distinction exists, however, between 
violations that affect people as compared to 
property. Violations against people are never 
excused, but when military necessity imperatively 
demands the destruction of civilian property, 
as determined by commanders at the time 
they decide to destroy the property, it may be 
allowable under very specific circumstances.73
mILITArY OBJECTIvE is a component of military 
necessity. Once a commander determines that 
taking a certain action or striking a certain target 
is a military necessity, then the target must be 
confirmed as a valid military objective. The 
current definition of military objectives is “those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose, 
or use make an effective contribution to military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage.”74 The Commentary on Additional 
Protocol I (AP I), which provides interpretive 
guidance for understanding AP I, states that it is 
not legitimate to launch an attack that offers only 
potential or indeterminate advantages.75 This 
statement raises important questions regarding 
attacking enemy morale, deception operations, 
and strategic views of advantage versus the 
tactical advantages of individual attacks.
DISTINCTION, or DISCrImINATION, means 
differentiating between combatants and 
noncombatants. “Parties to the conflict shall 
at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between 
During the Civil War, Professor Francis Lieber headed 
a team that drafted General Orders 100 (1863), also 
known as the Lieber Code, which governed the actions 
of Union forces in their conduct of the war and their 
treatment of civilians and prisoners of war. Lieber 
was born and educated in Germany, fought in the 
Napoleonic wars, and had sons who fought on both 
sides of the Civil War. Library of Congress, Prints and 
Photographs Division
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civilian objectives and military objectives, and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives.”76 Determining 
whether people can be valid military objectives 
requires either a status-based or a conduct-based 
determination. Enemy soldiers may usually 
be engaged at any time during armed conflict, 
regardless of whether they are actually involved 
in combat. Civilians remain protected as long 
as they do not take a direct part in hostilities. 
On the other hand, civilians are deemed to 
be targetable combatants when they choose 
to forgo their protected status and directly 
participate in hostilities.77 Combatants are 
not lawful targets if they are “out of combat,” 
meaning if they are prisoners of war,78 sick, 
wounded, or shipwrecked, or if they are medical 
personnel exclusively engaged in medical 
duties.79 Consistent with the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(GC III), before the United States considers 
enemy combatants prisoners of war, it requires 
that they be under responsible command, wear 
a distinctive sign or uniform recognizable at a 
distance, carry their arms openly, and generally 
abide by LOAC.80 Civilians and civilian property 
may not be the sole object of a military attack and 
may not be subjected to indiscriminate attack. 
Neither prisoners of war81 nor civilians may be 
subjected to reprisals,82 which are violations of 
LOAC intended to induce the enemy to stop 
committing LOAC violations.
prOpOrTIONALITY means that when commanders 
decide to execute an attack that may be expected 
to cause incidental injury or death to civilians or 
damage to civilian property, they must determine 
that the concrete and direct military advantage 
to be gained will not be outweighed by excessive 
collateral damage or injury to civilians and 
civilian property.83 If the target is purely military, 
with no civilian personnel or property in 
jeopardy, no proportionality analysis is required. 
A commander’s determination must be evaluated 
on the basis of the information available at the 
time.84 If civilians who were not known or could 
not reasonably have been known to be at the 
attack site are in fact injured, this circumstance 
does not change the validity of the commander’s 
decision to launch the attack.85 Further, this 
principle is in keeping with the reality that 
injuries to civilians often will be unavoidable 
regardless of how carefully commanders analyze 
their targeting decisions; these losses violate 
LOAC only when they are excessive compared to 
the military advantage to be gained.
The prINCIpLE Of HUmANITY or AvOIDING 
UNNECESSArY SUffErING means that military 
forces cannot use weapons against each other 
that are either designed or used to cause 
suffering unnecessary to accomplishing the 
military objective.86 Certain weapons, for 
example, are considered per se unlawful, such 
as glass-filled bullets.87 Other weapons are 
specifically prohibited by treaty because of their 
inhumane nature, such as chemical weapons.88 
Otherwise lawful weapons could be used in an 
unlawful manner, such as using a flamethrower 
against enemy troops in a bunker that has 
been doused in gasoline with the intention of 
inflicting severe pain and injury on the enemy 
troops.89 All US weapons are required to undergo 
a legal review to determine whether they 
conform to this principle.
vII. rules of Engagement
rULES Of ENGAGEmENT (rOE) are defined as 
“directives issued by competent military 
authority that delineate the circumstances and 
limitations under which US [naval, ground, and 
air] forces will initiate and/or continue combat 
engagement with other forces encountered.”90 
“As a practical matter, ROE perform three 
functions: (1) provide guidance from the 
president and secretary of defense (SECDEF), 
as well as subordinate commanders, to deployed 
units on the use of force; (2) act as a control 
mechanism for the transition from peacetime 
to combat operations (war); and (3) provide a 
mechanism to facilitate planning. ROE provide  
a framework that encompasses national strategic 
policy goals, mission requirements, and the rule 
of law.”91
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As to political purposes, “ROE ensure that 
national policies and objectives are reflected 
in the actions of commanders in the field, 
particularly under circumstances in which 
communication with higher authority is not 
possible. For example, in reflecting national 
political and diplomatic purposes, ROE may 
restrict the engagement of certain targets, or 
the use of particular weapons systems, out of 
a desire to tilt world opinion in a particular 
direction, place a positive limit on the escalation 
of hostilities, or not antagonize the enemy.”92
From a military perspective, ROE provide 
parameters within which commanders 
must operate to accomplish their assigned 
missions. These parameters include limits on 
commanders’ authority to use certain weapons 
or to respond in certain ways to provocative 
actions by potential adversaries.93 From a 
legal perspective, ROE ensure conformity 
with the legal authorities under which 
military operations are conducted. Although 
commanders may issue certain ROE to reinforce 
principles of the LOAC, commanders may 
also issue ROE that restrain the use of force 
significantly below that which would be 
lawful. This practice has been demonstrated 
by the tactical directives issued by succeeding 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
commanders in Afghanistan that require US 
forces to exercise tactical patience and take 
affirmative steps to minimize collateral injury  
and damage to civilians and their property.94
vIII. Command  
 responsibility
Although the United States has not ratified the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, the definition of command responsibility 
for military commanders that the statute sets 
out is consistent with the definition used by the 
US judges in the High Command Case, tried at 
the Subsequent Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
after World War II.95 The Rome Statute holds a 
commander criminally responsible for LOAC 
violations
committed by forces under his or her 
effective command and control, or effective 
authority and control as the case may be, 
as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such forces where:
(i) That military commander...either knew, 
or owing to the circumstances at the 
time, should have known that forces were 
committing or about to commit such 
crimes; and
Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb was tried in the 
High Command Case with other senior Wehrmacht 
commanders. He pled not guilty to crimes against 
humanity, consisting of mass atrocities against 
civilians by his soldiers. The Subsequent Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal found him guilty, holding that he 
either knew or should have known, by virtue of his 
command position and the information he received, 
that his soldiers were committing these barbarities. 
Nuremberg, Germany, 1947. US Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, courtesy of Vivien Putty Spitz
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(ii) That military commander...failed to take 
all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or 
repress their commission or to submit the 
matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.96
Interestingly, the Rome Statute also provides 
for command responsibility for civilian leaders 
of armed forces, but the standard of knowledge 
required of the actions of the soldiers committing 
the violations is significantly higher.97
The US definition sets out the boundaries of the 
concept of command responsibility a bit more 
crisply. Importantly, commanders are not strictly 
liable for all that their subordinates do that is 
unlawful; they must be guilty of an element of 
personal dereliction. A commander is liable if any 
of the following statements are true:
a.   the commander ordered the commission of 
the act; 
b.   the commander knew of the act, either before 
or during its commission, and did nothing to 
prevent or stop it; or
c.   the commander should have known, “through 
reports received by him or through other 
means, that troops or other persons subject 
to his control [were] about to commit or 
[had] committed a war crime and he fail[ed] 
to take the necessary and reasonable steps to 
insure compliance with [LOAC] or to punish 
violators thereof.”98
IX. Obedience to Orders
Under US law, military orders given by proper 
commanders are presumed to be lawful; therefore, 
the burden is on the recipients of orders to object 
if they believe the orders to be unlawful.99 To 
be lawful, an order must have a valid military 
purpose, and it must have a clear, narrowly drawn 
mandate.100 Although orders may seem puzzling 
or counter to what the recipient believes should 
be done, these qualities do not make the orders 
unlawful. Blindly following superior orders is 
not ordinarily a defense in a case of violation of 
LOAC, however; it “is only a possible defense if 
the defendant was required to obey the order, 
the defendant did not know it was unlawful, 
and the order was not manifestly unlawful.”101 
Accordingly, reasonableness depends on many 
factors, including the rank, position, education, 
and experience of the recipient.102 Since the end 
of Allied occupation and Germany’s recovery 
of sovereignty, international law has been 
received into German constitutional law directly, 
thus becoming German law.103 Interestingly, 
during the Second Gulf War, a German federal 
administrative court confirmed a German 
officer’s refusal to obey an order to participate in 
a software project that could have been used by 
the United States in that conflict. The German 
court found the officer’s disobedience to be 
justified because it found the war to be illegal 
under its reading of internationl law.104
If a US soldier receives a potentially illegal order, 
that soldier should not immediately obey but 
should instead seek clarification from superiors 
as to whether he or she has understood the 
order properly and, if so, whether it is lawful. 
If the order is clarified and confirmed but the 
soldier still believes it is illegal, the order should 
be reported to a higher command authority 
or a servicing judge advocate. Even if an order 
is illegal, this cannot be a basis by itself for a 
subordinate to attempt to relieve a superior from 
command. For soldiers to show that they were 
under duress to obey an illegal order, such that it 
would be a complete defense to the crimes they 
were alleged to have committed, they must make 
a very strong case. They must show that they 
were “under an immediate threat of severe and 
irreparable harm to life or limb, that there was 
no adequate means to avert the act, that the  
act.. .was not disproportionate to the evil 
threatened,.. .and the situation must not have 
been brought on voluntarily by” the soldiers 
themselves.105 However, “orders to commit 
genocide or crimes against humanity  
are manifestly unlawful.”106
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Depending on the situation, even if a subordinate 
is not relieved of responsibility for following an 
illegal order, a court might take the fact that a 
superior had ordered the act into consideration 
in assessing an appropriate punishment.107
X. Conclusion
The three different responses to the same illegal 
order by the three company commanders of 1st 
Battalion, 691st Infantry Regiment, provide an 
important empirical example of how officers 
making command decisions during armed 
conflict will define their duty in different 
ways depending upon the command climate, 
their individual experiences, their leadership 
style, their moral and ethical compasses, and 
their social and cultural values. The US Armed 
Forces take an oath to support and defend the 
US Constitution, which itself incorporates the 
Geneva Conventions and other LOAC treaties 
into US law. The reactions of the three company 
commanders provide a useful platform for 
discussion of the ethical and legal components  
of a US officer’s leadership philosophy, how  
that philosophy is put into action, and the 
dynamic relationship between command  
climate, obedience to orders, discipline, and  
the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
Field Marshal Wilhelm List, the chief defendant in the Hostage Case, receives his indictment at the Subsequent 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal charging him with mass reprisal killings of civilians. He pled not guilty, arguing he 
was under superior orders from Hitler. The Tribunal found he knew or should have known the orders violated 
international law and that he was in a position to prevent these atrocities. Nuremberg, Germany, May 12, 1947.  
US Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration 
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Opposite: A German firing squad executes suspected 





Appendix A:  
wehrmacht Orders
Excerpt from Decree on Exercising Military 
Jurisdiction in the Area of Barbarossa and Special 
Measures by Troops (Barbarossa Jurisdiction 
Order), May 13, 1941 108
I.   Treatment of crimes committed by enemy civilians 
 1.   Until further order the military courts and 
the courts-martial will not be competent 
for crimes committed by enemy civilians.
 2.   Francs-tireurs will be liquidated ruthlessly 
by the troops in combat or while fleeing. 
 3.   Also all other attacks by enemy civilians against 
the armed forces, its members, and auxiliaries 
will be suppressed on the spot by the troops 
with the most rigorous methods until the 
assailants are finished. 
 4.   Where such measures were not taken or at 
least were not possible, persons suspected of the 
act will be brought before an officer at once. This 
officer will decide whether they are to be shot.. . . 
II.   Treatment of crimes committed against inhabitants 
by members of the Wehrmacht and its auxiliaries
 1.   With regard to offenses committed against 
enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht 
or its auxiliaries, prosecution is not obligatory, 
even where the deed is at the same time a 
military crime or misdemeanour. 
Excerpt from Directives for the Behavior of 
the Troops in Russia, issued by the Armed 
Forces High Command (Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht [OKW]), May 19, 1941 109
1.  Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of the National 
Socialist German people. Germany’s struggle  
is directed against this subversive ideology and  
its functionaries.
2.   This struggle requires ruthless and energetic 
action against Bolshevik agitators, guerillas, 
saboteurs, and Jews, and the total elimination 
of all active or passive resistance.
3.   The members of the Red Army—including 
prisoners—must be treated with extreme 
reserve and the greatest caution since one must 
reckon with devious methods of combat. The 
asiatic soldiers of the Red Army in particular 
are devious, cunning, and without feeling.
4.   When taking units prisoner, the leader must be 
separated from the other ranks at once.
5.   In the Soviet Union the German soldier is  
not confronted with a unified population. The 
USSR is a state which unites a multiplicity of 
Slav, Caucasian, and asiatic peoples which are 
held together by the Bolshevik rulers by force. 
Jewry is strongly represented in the USSR... .
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Appendix B:  
Excerpt from “Army 
regulation 15-6: 
Investigation Guide for 
Informal Investigations”110
V.  Concluding the Investigation
1.   Preparing Findings and Recommendations. 
After all the evidence is collected, the 
Investigating Officer (IO) must review it and 
make findings. The IO should consider the 
evidence thoroughly and impartially and make 
findings of fact and recommendations that are 
supported by the facts and comply with the 
instructions of the appointing authority.
 a.   Facts: To the extent possible, the IO should 
fix dates, places, persons, and events, 
definitely and accurately. The IO should 
be able to answer questions such as: What 
occurred? When did it occur? How did 
it occur? Who was involved, and to what 
extent? Exact descriptions and values of any 
property at issue in the investigation should 
be provided.
 b.   Findings: A finding is a clear and concise 
statement that can be deduced from the 
evidence in the record. In developing 
findings, IOs are permitted to rely on the 
facts and any reasonable inferences that 
may be drawn from those facts. In stating 
findings, IOs should refer to the exhibit or 
exhibits relied upon in making each finding 
(e.g., “PFC Smith was intoxicated at the 
time of the collision, with a Blood Alcohol 
Content of .17 (See Exhibit E.)”). See AR 15-
6, para. 3–9. You may find it appropriate to 
make negative findings (including findings 
of no fault, no loss, or no wrongdoing). 
Negative findings must also be supported 
by the documented evidence that will 
become part of the report.
   If a finding is based on your observations, 
the observations should be explained 
in a Memorandum for Record (MFR) 
or reflected in a photograph or video. 
Normally the IO will obtain sworn 
statements from all witnesses involved, but 
only after providing a rights advisement 
form to any witness suspected of 
wrongdoing, and not simply produce an 
MFR that summarizes witness testimony. 
Exhibits should be numbered in the 
order they are discussed in the findings. 
Note that often the IO will be faced with 
conflicting or contradictory statements. 
The mere fact that only two individuals 
were present in a room and each testifies 
to contrary facts does not mean that the 
witnesses cancel each other out. You must 
decide who you believe and explain in your 
findings why you find one witness to be 
more credible than another. This should 
be based on corroboration, credibility, 
and common sense. For example, it may be 
based on a mere believable description of 
the events because one witness’ demeanor 
and method of answering questions 
appears forthright rather than evasive.
 c.   Recommendations: Recommendations 
should take the form of proposed courses 
of action consistent with the findings, 
such as disciplinary action, imposition 
of financial liability, or corrective action. 
Recommendations must be supported 
by the facts and consistent with the 
findings. Each recommendation should 
cite the specific findings that support the 
recommendation.
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This appendix includes a translation of the 
state court decision in the case against Nöll and 
Zimber;111 it is worthwhile to read in its entirety as 
an original source. To summarize, they were not 
found guilty of murder as defined in Section 211 
of the 1871 German Penal Code,112 which was the 
law applicable at the time of the offenses. Instead, 
the court confirmed the trial court’s verdict that 
they were guilty of violating Section 212, being 
accessories to intentional killing, or manslaughter. 
To reach this result, the court first examined the 
conduct of Commichau and decided that his 
order to kill all of the Jews did not constitute an 
order to commit murder. Because he had issued 
his order as a matter of reprisal against a group 
whom he suspected of supporting the partisans, 
the court decided that he did not have a base 
motive, such as antisemitism or bloodlust, in 
giving the order. Reprisal against even innocent 
civilians to deter others from violating LOAC by 
acting as or supporting partisans was not illegal 
prior to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.113 Such 
specific intent was required to prove murder 
under Section 211. Under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), murder also requires a 
specific intent, but it is framed more broadly:
Premeditated murder is murder committed 
after the formation of a specific intent 
to kill someone and consideration of the 
act intended. It is not necessary that the 
intention to kill have been entertained for 
any particular or considerable length of 
time. When a fixed purpose to kill has been 
deliberately formed, it is immaterial how 
soon afterwards it is put into execution. 
The existence of premeditation may be 
inferred from the circumstances.114
What made the order illegal in the view of the 
state court, however, was its scope. Reprisal 
resulting in the annihilation of an entire group 
of people, especially when it included the 
killing of children, violated the principle of 
humanity. A seasoned and mature staff officer, 
Commichau must have known this; Nöll and 
Zimber should have known it as well. Nöll and 
Zimber were required by the Military Penal 
Code to not obey an illegal order. The state 
court found that Nöll should have requested 
clarification from Commichau and advised the 
battalion commander that he had only elderly 
men, women, and children in his AO, and that 
there was no reasonable fear on his part that 
would justify obeying the illegal order. Nöll 
and Zimber were therefore found guilty of 
being accessories to killing under Section 212, 
which would be equivalent to involuntary 
manslaughter under the UCMJ.115 Because of 
extenuating circumstances, Nöll was sentenced 
to only three years’ imprisonment and Zimber 
to two.116
Certain historians and legal scholars have 
described a general reluctance on the part of 
the postwar German legal system to prosecute 
and punish German war criminals.117 This was in 
part due to the complexity of trying these cases 
in evidentiary and procedural terms, as well as 
the poor fit between the applicable German 
homicide jurisprudence and the nature of the 
acts committed by the alleged perpetrators.118 
Other, less neutral factors complicated the 
trials as well. The German legal profession had 
quickly brought itself in line with Nazi ideology 
after the party came to power, and judges were 
expected to implement the Nazi perspective 
in their decisions.119 Many of these individuals 
continued to play important roles in the postwar 
German judiciary, despite denazification; for 
example, as late as 1949, 81 percent of judges 
serving in Bavaria were former Nazis.120 Further, 
many police investigators and other personnel 
had served in the Nazi police and sometimes 
even in the SD or Einsatzgruppen, and they 
sometimes helped their comrades. For example, 
when German police officials served a search 
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warrant on the former commander of the SD in 
Warsaw, Ludwig Hahn, they were astonished 
to find that he already had “not just ten binders 
of photocopied witness statements [in the case 
against him] but also photocopies of the most 
recent notes of the States Attorney’s office [in the 
case against him] from which he could learn the 
names and addresses of witnesses who had not yet 
been interviewed.”121
To more fully understand the legal reasoning of 
the court in reaching its decision, it is important 
to have an appreciation of its military and legal 
historical context. This lesson is about ethics 
and leadership at the small-unit level, but it is 
important to remember that company-level 
military culture is but one part of a larger whole 
of organizational climate and culture, and that 
those higher level manifestations of ethics and 
leadership are themselves both a reflection and  
a refraction of national and international societal 
and legal norms.
Historical Treatment of partisans  
by German forces
German forces had historically implemented 
a very definite approach to the treatment of 
captured partisans. During the Franco-Prussian 
War, French civilians (so-called franc-tireurs) 
took up arms against the Prussian invaders and 
conducted guerilla warfare.122 When captured by 
Prussian forces, these civilians ordinarily were 
executed if found guilty by courts-martial, and 
many were apparently executed without benefit 
of trial.123 During the abortive 1870 negotiations 
between the French Foreign Minister Jules Favre 
and Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck, 
Favre complained about this harsh treatment, 
noting the civilians were merely defending their 
homeland, as was their right. Bismarck rejected 
this position, stating, “They are not soldiers, 
and we are treating them as murderers” and “we 
only recognize as soldiers those under regular 
discipline; the others are outlaws.”124 When Favre 
objected that the franc-tireurs were only doing 
what Prussian civilians had done in 1813 fighting 
Napoleon’s forces, Bismarck retorted, “True 
enough, but our trees still bear the traces of the 
civilians whom your generals hanged on them.”125
partisans and LOAC prior to world war II
By 1907, international law regarding civilians 
taking up arms against invading regular forces 
of another state had been modified to a degree. 
Under the 1907 Hague Regulations, “[t]he 
inhabitants of a territory which has not been 
occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading 
troops … shall be regarded as belligerents if they 
carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and 
customs of war,” so-called levées en masse.126 The 
authoritative Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege (“Usage 
of Land Warfare,” or “War Book”), published by 
the Prussian General Staff for the guidance of 
commanders and in use until the end of World 
War I, however, took the position that as a matter 
of practice, such civilians should not be treated 
as privileged combatants unless they also had 
“a responsible leader, military organization, 
and clear recognizability” as opposing fighters 
through the wearing of distinctive insignia.127 
The 1907 Hague Regulations did not address, 
and therefore did not change, the legal 
status of civilians who took up arms after the 
commencement of occupation.
German law provided that inhabitants of German-
occupied territory were subject to courts-martial 
for certain offenses, including “war rebellion,” 
which was defined as “the taking up of arms by 
the inhabitants against the occupation.”128 The 
Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege took the position that 
such civilians who took up arms could be treated 
as lawful combatants if they were in organized 
units commanded by a responsible official, carried 
their arms in the open, wore a recognizable and 
distinctive insignia, and followed LOAC.129 This 
standard was consistent with the 1907 Hague 
Regulations stating the criteria that must be met 
for a detained member of an opposing armed 
force to be considered a prisoner of war,130 and 
the standard mirrors the German requirements 
for a valid levée en masse. Further, to receive 
this treatment as an individual fighter, in the 
28
German view, one would still need to produce “a 
certificate of membership in an armed band.”131
The 1929 Geneva Convention dealt with the 
treatment of prisoners of war. It was applicable 
between the signatories; and although France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States signed and ratified the treaty, the Soviet 
Union did not.132 The 1929 Geneva Convention 
incorporated the Hague Regulations’ standards 
for who was considered a prisoner of war;133 the 
legal status of civilians who took up arms after the 
commencement of an occupation did not change.
Training and Education in LOAC
In the 1890s, in terms of the training and 
education of German army officers in LOAC, 
mid-career officers at the War Academy in Berlin 
received during their second year of studies 
one hour per week of “military law”; during 
their third year, they had two hours per week 
of instruction in “municipal and international 
law, [and] state administration.”134 On the eve 
of  World War II, however, the amount of 
instruction in legal matters may have decreased, 
for it is not even mentioned in the report of a US 
Army officer who attended the War Academy as a 
separate course of instruction.135 As to the training 
and education received by noncommissioned 
officers and soldiers prior to and during World 
War II, two types of documents are worth noting: 
Der Dienstunterricht im Heere (Army Service 
Training), a series of army handbooks written by 
a German military lawyer for noncommissioned 
officers of different branches of the Wehrmacht; 
and the Soldbuch (pay book), the identification 
books that each Wehrmacht soldier used to 
record his promotions and personal information, 
such as blood type and gas mask size. Both 
documents included guidance regarding the 
treatment of civilians who took up arms against 
the German military.
The first edition of Army Service Training 
was published in 1929, and it continued to be 
published in subsequent editions throughout 
most of the war.136 Army Service Training tracked 
with the 1907 Hague Regulations in that civilians 
participating in a levée en masse were recognized 
as privileged combatants as long as they bore 
their weapons in the open and followed LOAC.137 
The publication noted that once the territory was 
occupied, however, civilians bearing arms were 
subject to Standrecht, or summary martial law.138 
Specifically, the handbook noted, “[f ]ranc-tireurs 
are private individuals who commit hostile acts 
without fulfilling the requirements for the levée 
en masse. In so far as they are not met in battle, 
they fall under summary martial law.”139 The 
extent to which these books might have been 
required reading or incorporated into education 
and training is unknown.
Much less detailed was the guidance given to 
the enlisted soldier through the pay books. On 
their inside front covers, the pay books often 
contained the “Ten Commandants” for the 
conduct of war by German soldiers. The first 
commandment states, “The German soldier 
fights chivalrously for the victory of his people. 
Atrocities and useless destruction are unworthy 
of him.”140 The third commandment reads, “No 
enemy may be killed who surrenders, including 
the partisan and the spy. They will receive their 
rightful punishments through the courts.”141 
The seventh commandment reads, “The civilian 
population is inviolable. The soldier may not 
plunder or wantonly destroy.”142 Not all pay 
book editions contained this information, and 
photographs or other documentation often 
covered it when it was present.143
German military Justice and Discipline
In all armed forces, service member behavior 
is shaped by positive guidance, such as that 
detailed above, and disincentives, such as the fear 
of punishment for transgression of disciplinary 
codes. Article 47 of the German Military Penal 
Law, which was in effect between 1872 and 1945, 
provided that subordinates who followed orders 
were not criminally liable as long as they had 
acted within the scope of the authority given 
to them by the orders, or as long as they did 
not know the order commanded a violation 
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of German domestic or military law. In the 
post–World War I trials of alleged German war 
criminals at Leipzig by the German Supreme 
Court, for example, Lieutenant-Captain Karl 
Neumann, a submarine commander who had 
torpedoed and sunk a British hospital ship, was 
found to not be criminally responsible. The 
court held that because he had been following 
orders from the German Admiralty to engage 
such ships within certain areas, and because the 
orders were in the nature of a lawful reprisal 
against alleged British misuse of hospital ships 
during the conflict, he had remained within the 
directions provided to him, and he had had no 
reason to believe the orders were illegal.144 On 
the other hand, submariners who shot survivors 
in the water per their captain’s order after the 
captain knowingly torpedoed a hospital ship 
outside such an engagement zone to hide the 
unauthorized attack were found guilty of being 
accessories to murder.145
The Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order issued by the 
German High Command prior to the invasion of 
the Soviet Union significantly diluted the legal 
measures that the German military ordinarily 
used to enforce discipline in the armed forces.146 
In particular, partisans and Jews were to be dealt 
with ruthlessly, and suspected partisans were to 
be brought immediately before an officer, who 
would decide whether they should be shot.147 
Second, court-martial-convening authorities 
lost jurisdiction to try offenses committed by 
Wehrmacht troops against enemy civilians unless 
the courts-martial were expected to have a 
positive impact on order and discipline.148 Some 
German generals expressed concern that this 
order was illegal and dishonorable149 and, perhaps 
to a greater degree, that it would negatively affect 
good order and discipline in the Wehrmacht 
ranks.150 In response to these concerns, the 
commander-in-chief of the German Army, Field 
Marshal von Brauchitsch, issued a clarification 
supplementing the order, which stated:
[U]nder all circumstances it will remain  
the duty of all superiors to prevent  
arbitrary excesses of individual members of 
the Army and to prevent in time the troops 
becoming unmanageable. It must not come 
to it that the individual soldier commits or 
omits any act he thinks proper toward the 
indigenous population; he must rather feel 
that in every case he is bound by the orders 
of his officers. I consider it very important 
that this be clearly understood down to the 
lowest unit. Timely action by every officer, 
especially every company commander, etc., 
must help to maintain discipline, the basis of 
our successes.151
Von Brauchitsch’s clarification was grounded 
in discipline, not humanity, but several senior 
Wehrmacht commanders chose to disregard the 
Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order in their respective 
AOs because they realized it would negatively 
affect discipline because of its inhumanity.152 
Objectively, however, if serious abuse of civilians 
became, in effect, the norm when ordered, then 
demonstrating at a court-martial that it had a 
prejudicial effect on good order and discipline 
when committed by a soldier on his own volition 
likely became difficult. Further, because the 
approval of sentences handed down by courts-
martial still required approval by higher officials, 
a court-martial conviction was no longer a 
guarantee that a soldier would actually be 
punished. In one case, for example, a battalion 
commander killed several Soviet POWs. He was 
court-martialed, convicted, and sentenced to loss 
of rank and two years in prison. Because he had 
killed the Soviet POWs in revenge for the death 
of his brother at the hands of partisans, however, 
Hitler quashed the sentence when it came to him 
for review.153
After the war, trials of alleged war criminals 
generally resulted in few convictions and lenient 
sentences.154 The case that perhaps puts the Nöll 
and Zimber decision in the most objective light 
was tried a few years later, about 25 kilometers 
north of Darmstadt: the trial of SS personnel 
who ran the Auschwitz-Birkenau killing center. 
After a five-year investigation by the Hesse 
attorney-general’s office, which generated a 
700-page indictment that included a 200-page 
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history of Auschwitz and the testimony of 252 
witnesses, 24 defendants stood trial for the 
murders committed there.155 Paradoxically, to try 
to prove murder under the 1871 Penal Code, the 
prosecution first had to establish the governing 
nature of the SS regulations that had been in 
place during the center’s administration.156 
Predictably, with regard to the treatment 
afforded prisoners, these regulations were 
themselves extremely harsh.157 Once the nature 
of the regulations was established, however, 
the prosecution presented testimony showing 
that certain defendants had exceeded these 
regulations in terms of cruelty to prisoners and, 
therefore, had been acting upon base motives 
in the killings they committed, making them 
murderers.158 Those defendants against whom 
the prosecution could not bring such specific 
evidence, such as Nöll and Zimber, were 
generally convicted of being accessories and 
likewise received relatively lenient sentences.159
TrANSLATION Of DECISION
In the Criminal proceedings against  
the Teacher N[öll] and the Criminal Justice 
Secretary z[imber]. 160
Judgment of the State Court in Darmstadt of 
March 10, 1956 (No. 429)
In the Name of the People
In the criminal proceedings against
 1.   N[öll], a teacher, born on November 7, 1897, 
in Darmstadt, resident of the same, married, 
no prior convictions
 2.   Z[imber], police official [Kriminalsekretär], 
born on September 2, 1915, in Madretsch, 
Canton Bern (Switzerland), resident of 
Constance, married, no prior convictions
For accessory to manslaughter.
The trial court [Schwurgericht] at the State Court 
in Darmstadt on the basis of proceedings held on 
March 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10, 1956, and on March 
10, 1956, recognized as just:
 
 The defendants N[öll] and Z[imber] are guilty  
 of accessory to involuntary manslaughter
  –  Crimes under Sections 212, 213, 49 of the 
Penal Code and Section 47 of the Military 
Penal Code.
 
 Sentence was pronounced for:
 
 Defendant N[öll] to three years in jail
 
 Defendant Z[imber] to two years in jail
 
  The defendants must pay court costs with the 
proviso that the fee for appeals will be reduced 
by a third for both defendants.161 
Legal Analysis 162
The defendants N[öll] and Z[imber], each 
through one and the same action, are guilty as 
an accessory to at least 15 acts of involuntary 
manslaughter (Crimes pursuant to Sections 212, 
213, 49 of the Penal Code and Section 47 of the 
Military Penal Code), because they knowingly 
assisted through their actions the criminal intent 
of the battalion commander to kill the Jews  
in Krutscha.
A soldier in the performance of his duty is only 
then criminally responsible, as a participant, 
in the execution of an illegal command under 
Section 47, Subsection 1, Number 2, of the 
Military Penal Code if he knows that the 
command of the superior concerned an action 
whose object is a general or military crime or 
offense. Under this provision, the Military 
Penal Code, which, despite its repeal by [Allied] 
Control Council Law Number 34, is to be applied 
[here] since it was valid law at the time of the 
crime (Section 2, Subsection 2 of the Penal Code), 
responsibility for an official order, which if 
followed would result in a violation of criminal 
law, belongs exclusively to the commanding 
superior. The subordinate may obey [without 
penalty] as long as he was not aware of the non-
binding nature of the command because of its 
criminal purpose. But should the subordinate 
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realize that the superior intended the commission 
of a crime as a result of his order, he must refuse 
to carry out this illegal order. Otherwise, he faces 
punishment as a participant [in the crime].
1. By his order “to shoot the Jews in Krutscha,” 
the battalion commander caused the killing 
of at least 15 Jewish inhabitants of the village. 
However, he cannot be classified as a murderer 
because the trial court once again at the 
rehearing could not come to the conclusion  
that the battalion commander acted because  
of base motives.
A base motive could have been attributed to the 
order to shoot if it could be determined that the 
battalion commander had issued the order to 
his subordinates on racial grounds that aimed 
at the elimination of the Jewish population in 
the area of his command. The suspicion that this 
could have been the case is based on the scope 
of the measures ordered, the undetermined 
number of persons to be removed, defined 
racially so that only a part of the population 
would be targeted without regard to age or 
sex. This is further supported by the evidence 
that has been established about the telephone 
calls between the battalion commander and the 
witness S[ibille]. Moreover, the witness Wilhelm 
Mü., who served as regimental adjutant and 
therefore possessed a clear insight into the events 
of that time, expressed his suspicions that the 
executions of Jews in the operational area of the 
first battalion could have been instigated by the 
training conference in Mogilev. The training 
in Mogilev was described outwardly as an anti-
partisan training, but in reality it served to 
promote the annihilation of the Jews for racial 
reasons. Moreover, the entire regiment believed 
that Major Commichau had been influenced in 
this regard by First Lieutenant Kuhls. This belief 
was reinforced because of Kuhls’s political views, 
which, according to the witness, were clearly 
sympathetic to the “Third Reich.” Although 
under these circumstances racial motives 
appear very likely, it cannot be determined with 
certainty that it was these particular motives 
that brought the battalion commander to issue 
the order to shoot. The battalion commander 
Commichau was killed in action. But, it has been 
established that Commichau expressed in front 
of his former regiment commander that partisans 
were repeatedly aided by the inhabitants of the 
village and that he was forced to this reprisal 
measure as deterrence. Therefore, there is not 
sufficient evidence for establishing base motives 
for the battalion commander.
The content of the order, and other circumstances 
as well as one of the elements of the crime as 
required under Section 211 of the Penal Code 
[Murder] do not apply to the person of Major 
Commichau. It cannot be assumed therefore that 
he intended the murder of the Jewish population. 
The order’s purpose was the intentional killing of 
human beings in terms of Section 212 of the Penal 
Code [Manslaughter].
The order to shoot was unlawful because 
there was no legal justification for battalion 
commander Commichau’s actions.
Neither are the prerequisites present for self-
defense in the sense of acting in defense against 
imminent, unlawful attack. Around the time 
of the shooting, Defendant N[öll]’s company 
had scarcely come into contact with partisans. 
Neither was there an ongoing partisan attack 
nor was such an attack imminent. There was a 
partisan raid on battalion headquarters at the 
end of September 1941 during which two soldiers 
were killed. But that raid had taken place while 
the unit marched into position and while they 
were outside of the operational area assigned 
to the troops during the first days of October. 
Further, the raid had occurred days before and 
in no way justified as self-defense the shooting of 
the Jewish inhabitants of Krutscha. A connection 
between the Jewish or even the non-Jewish 
population of Krutscha and the partisans could 
not be established nor would such a connection 
have required the annihilation of an entire 
segment of the population. 
The order to shoot was also not justified by 
the internationally agreed upon laws of war. 
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As outlined in the opinion of the appellate 
court, no one could possibly have doubted the 
illegality of the battalion commander’s orders 
to shoot the Jewish population in the area 
of operations just because he suspected that 
this segment of the population supported the 
partisans and therefore needed to be eliminated 
in the name of security for the troops or in order 
to fulfill their mission in the final suppression 
of all partisan activity in the area assigned to 
them. The laws of war do not include the right 
of a leader whose forces are endangered by 
guerilla warfare to claim military necessity as 
justification for the annihilation of the entire 
enemy civilian population. Despite suspicions in 
support of this claim, it could not be definitively 
established that such considerations led the 
battalion commander to issue the order to shoot, 
because the battalion commander died in the 
war, and the testimony of Erich Mü. indicated 
the commander had ordered the shooting as a 
deterrent.
Therefore, it is to be assumed that Major 
Commichau ordered the companies he 
commanded to shoot Jews to deter the entire 
population from collaboration with partisans 
and to force the enemy to stop partisan activities 
in general. In the opinion of the trial court, 
it was the training in Mogilev that led him to 
choose the Jewish population as the target 
of his reprisal. It is therefore to be examined 
whether the order to shoot all Jews in Krutscha 
is to be understood as a reprisal—that is, the 
internationally recognized right as a last resort 
to force the opponent, his military forces, and 
his population to abide by the laws of war as the 
laws of war were understood at the time of the 
shooting (compare: Schütze, Die Repressalie, p. 
41). The trial court rejected that argument.
The German Federal Supreme Court ruled on 
this matter in the judgment of April 28, 1955, 
that the killing of innocent enemy nationals 
as a response to enemy conduct contrary to 
international law is legal both in terms of the 
actual practice of states and in the literature of 
international law. The only question contested 
at that time was whether the admissibility of 
measures of reprisal should depend on additional 
prerequisites or just conduct by the opposing 
side that is contrary to the internationally agreed 
upon laws of war. Or whether a warning should 
precede any action, or whether there needs to 
be a geographical or chronological relationship 
between the conduct that violates international 
law and the measures of reprisal that such 
conduct provokes, or whether reprisals must be 
proportional to the violations of international 
law by the opponent. The International Court 
of Justice and the American Military Tribunals 
in Nuremberg tried to establish those kinds of 
prerequisites for permissible reprisal killings. 
However, for the acts committed before these 
judgments those prerequisites are not proven to 
be part of general state practice and therefore 
not valid international law. On the other hand, 
however, as the Federal Supreme Court has 
outlined further, international law recognizes 
that even by reprisals the laws of humanity must 
be respected. Even if the principle of humanity 
does not preclude the killing of innocent people 
as a reprisal per se, it does in any case forbid the 
killing of children, especially infants.
The trial court adopted this legal opinion [of the 
Federal Supreme Court] pursuant to Section 358, 
Subsection I, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
At the time the order to shoot was issued, there 
had already been enemy conduct contrary to 
internationally accepted laws of war, which is 
the fundamental requirement for a [legitimate] 
reprisal. As has been established, the infantry 
regiment 691, which included the first battalion 
under Major Commichau, was moved to the 
Orscha-Smolensk area, because the security 
division deployed in the rearward area of Army 
Group Center was no longer sufficient to protect 
supply lines to the front and suppress partisan 
activities. Moreover, it is likely and has not been 
refuted that there were also partisans in the 
forests of the area of operation that was allocated 
to the first battalion in early October 1941 and 
that these partisans were supported by segments 
of the population—that they conducted their 
activities in civil clothes without special insignia 
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and were therefore in violation of the principles of 
international law, as required especially by Article 
2 of the Hague Convention regarding the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land. In order to force 
the enemy to comply with internationally agreed 
upon principles, the battalion commander was 
authorized to take effective and tough measures 
of reprisal even against innocent segments of 
the population. However, he was absolutely not 
allowed to exceed the limits imposed by the 
imperatives of humanity. But that is what he did 
when he issued the order to shoot “the Jews,” 
i.e., the shooting of an entire segment of the 
population, that is, numerically not specified, 
but only racially distinguished segment of the 
population including all children. This was a 
measure that even under the circumstances of the 
times, no law-abiding person could reasonably 
have regarded as a lawful act of war; unless 
anything would be considered admissible in war. 
In Prof. Dr. Schw.’s expert opinion, expressed 
in his affidavit, it is doubtful that at the start 
of World War II, the requirement to comply 
with the limits imposed by humanity while 
imposing retaliation measures had already been 
common state practice. He rather thinks that 
only the aspect of military necessity need be 
considered when evaluating reprisals (similarly 
see: Siegert, Requisition und Höherer Befehl, p. 21 
ff.). Notwithstanding the opinion of the trial 
court that the killing of innocent people as a 
reprisal is always inhumane if such killings are not 
required by military necessity; insofar as a factual 
difference does not exist, therefore the order of 
the battalion commander would have also been 
illegal according to this opinion, because military 
necessity did not require the shooting of the 
entire Jewish population that consisted mainly 
of older men and women and children of all ages. 
Witness S[ibille] has confirmed this. The order to 
kill was therefore as a consequence of its content 
under all circumstances illegal.
The criminal liability of the defendant further 
requires that the battalion commander aimed 
at committing a crime through his order and 
that this was known to them. As stated by the 
appellate court, criminal intent does not need to 
be understood as requiring that the criminal aim 
of the ordered act be understood or even that its 
unlawfulness had been the motive or the aim of 
the order, because this requirement would mean 
that criminal responsibility for orders contrary 
to international law would be eliminated in 
practice. The fact that the act was ordered so as 
to reach a lawful military aim cannot lead to a 
rejection of the action’s criminal intent. It rather 
has to be sufficient that the person issuing the 
order is completely sure that the execution of the 
order is unlawful and criminal. 
It was not possible to hear testimony on 
his intentions from battalion commander 
Commichau as he was killed during the war. 
However, this does not preclude the possibility 
of making a determination on this point. Not 
having such evidence, a court is often forced 
to get an idea of intent through inference 
from the facts that are visible from the outside 
and by referring to its body of experience 
[Erfahrungssätze] in cases where the accused 
either refuses to testify or denies having fulfilled 
the element of intent in committing a crime. 
Commichau certainly was a mature adult and a 
staff officer. As such, he must have known that 
even measures of reprisal have to have their 
limits and that it is not possible to reconcile the 
view of law-abiding people with the necessity 
of killing an entire segment of the population, 
one that was determined by race and included 
children, only because individuals of this race 
had supported the partisans or were continuing 
to support partisans; not even if it is intended to 
deter the rest of the population. Even though he 
might have followed the principle “right is what 
benefits the German people”—as espoused by his 
supreme commander [Hitler]—even though he 
might have considered the lives of others as less 
valuable as indicated by the testimony of S[ibille] 
that he used the term “liquidate” in referring to 
the shootings. Nevertheless, it could not have 
been unclear to him that his draconian measure 
was incompatible with the general sense of what 
constitutes justice. This justifies the finding that 
he knew that his order to kill did not comply 
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with valid law in force at that time. His order 
therefore concerned a crime pursuant to Section 
212 of the Penal Code.
2. This could not possibly have been hidden 
to the accused N[öll] even though he contests 
it. The fact that the order to kill could, for 
example, be covered by the so-called limitation 
on court jurisdiction order [Gerichtsbarkeitsbefehl] 
is irrelevant for him because this order—as 
he knew—referred exclusively to combating 
partisans or other such persons, who attacked 
or supported attacks on the German armed 
forces, or its retinue. This prerequisite could 
not possibly have applied to the entire Jewish 
population of Krutscha and especially not to 
their children. Even if the defendant N[öll] had 
assumed that the battalion commander had 
ordered the shootings as a deterrent because 
something or other had happened or because 
he suspected the collaboration of the Jewish 
population with the partisans, it had been 
nevertheless clear to defendant N[öll] that this 
would not justify such a measure. He knew that 
the order was to shoot all Jews in the town, even 
all the children as well, without regard to age. 
He could not be in doubt that this action would 
never be permissible under international law.
The illegality of such reprisals is—as stated by  
the Federal Supreme Court—obvious, i.e., 
known to everyone.
It follows then that defendant N[öll] too 
realized the injustice of that measure and that he 
moreover knew that the battalion commander 
was also aware of the illegality of such a reprisal. 
In addition the behavior of the defendant as 
he received the verbal order and during the 
subsequent discussions in the office, either after 
the verbal order was issued or after receipt of the 
written order, makes certain that the illegality of 
the order—an order for annihilation and one that 
scorned every feeling of humanity—was clear to 
him. His acknowledgement that he thought there 
could have been a reporting error and therefore 
requested written confirmation of the order in 
the hope that such written confirmation would 
not be forthcoming is further evidence of his 
knowledge; as was his behavior at the meetings 
held at the orderly office after the arrival of 
both the verbal and the written order. This 
justifies the finding that defendant N[öll] had 
certain knowledge of the criminal purpose of the 
ordered action as required by Section 47 of the 
Military Penal Code.
Finally, according to his own statements, it has 
also been known to defendant N[öll] since his 
service in World War I that a soldier can refuse 
the execution of an order that he recognizes 
as criminal. Thus, he knew the basic content 
of Article 47 of the Military Penal Code and 
therefore knew that an obviously unlawful 
order of the battalion commander was not 
binding for him. The fact that he nevertheless 
executed the order was undoubtedly out of 
fear. He convincingly testified to this during 
the main proceedings. Maybe he did it also 
because he shared the common fear in those 
days that helping ostracized people [Jews] 
could be detrimental—he could be regarded 
as a political enemy. He was, after all, a tenured 
official (teacher) in the civil service. Perhaps 
he also feared to be regarded as weak. Possibly 
he anticipated a report of his refusal. However, 
fearing trouble does not excuse his behavior. 
Also, the fear of a report of his refusal cannot 
exonerate him as he knew that he would not 
have to execute an obviously unlawful order. 
Therefore, he did not need to fear punishment.
The actions of the accused N[öll] are not 
excused by virtue of the necessity to obey orders 
[Befehlsnotstand] according to Section 54 of the 
Penal Code. He was not placed in a situation 
where his only option was to follow the order 
to shoot. There was no deadline set for his 
compliance to the order. He already had two or 
three days’ time before the written confirmation 
of the order arrived in which to consider how 
to avoid or circumvent the order that he judged 
to be criminal. Moreover, after the arrival of 
the written order there was no reason for him 
to carry out the order the next day, particularly 
since the order lacked justification and a time 
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limit for its execution. Therefore, there was no 
reason to assume that the order was particularly 
urgent. In contrast to witness S[ibille], he had 
not had any direct contact with the battalion 
headquarters and could assess the situation in his 
area of command on his own authority and due 
to the expanse of his district, he was free to make 
his own decisions to such an extent that from 
the point of view of the expert witness von G., 
it had been possible for him to reject the order 
by referring to the military situation in the area 
covered by his company.
With regard to the consequences of this order, 
he had both the possibility and the duty to 
personally contact the battalion commander in 
order to clarify what had induced him to issue 
such a grave measure. In preparation for this he 
should have reconnoitered the area to determine 
the composition and number of Jewish residents 
covered by the order. The fact that the order only 
concerned elderly men, women, and children 
was an indication that he should have attempted 
to get the battalion commander to retract the 
order or at least restrict its application. In doing 
so, he could have referred to the consequences 
that carrying out the order to kill would have had 
on the decent-thinking portion of the Russian 
population. The defendant N[öll] had known 
the battalion commander since the formation 
of the regiment and had become more closely 
acquainted with him during his time in Jena. He 
knew therefore that a personal discussion would 
not have angered the battalion commander. 
Here too, the defendant was not hindered by 
the distance between the command posts of 
the battalion and the company. According 
to the statement of witness Wa., the supply 
squad, which traveled on foot, accompanied 
by a horse-drawn wagon, covered the distance 
to the battalion headquarters and back in one 
day. That would have been reasonable for the 
defendant to do, especially since he could travel 
using the dispatch group as cover, maybe even 
riding on horseback or in the convoy. If he, 
however, believed that it was not permissible for 
him to leave his company post, then at least he 
could have sent his company officer Lieutenant 
Schlepper for this purpose to battalion 
headquarters. The defendant is an intelligent 
man and had been employed as an experienced 
company commander since the beginning of the 
Second World War. It is apparent that he knew of 
this possibility.
If the defendant had refused the order he would 
also have faced no immediate threat to life and 
limb. At the time the battalion commander issued 
the order, he was not reminded of his duty to 
obey, and was certainly not compelled by force 
of arms to its implementation and therefore was 
not under any psychological pressure to comply. 
Further, there was no evidence that the battalion 
commander would apply such pressure in the 
future. Defendant N[öll] had no reason to fear 
the implementation of court-martial proceedings 
for insubordination in the field because he was 
well aware that he had no need to obey an order 
to shoot since he understood that such an order 
was illegal.
There is no evidence that defendant N[öll] 
willingly acted on his own accord. He has, 
rather, by passing on the order of the battalion 
commander in full knowledge of its criminal 
purpose to the defendant Z[imber], made 
himself complicit in a criminal offense and 
additionally, through one and the same action, 
knowingly rendered assistance in the killing of  
at least 15 people.
3. Defendant Z[imber] had similarly recognized 
that the order of the battalion commander whose 
implementation had been transferred to N[öll] 
involved actions that were criminal in nature. 
As has been determined, he shared the belief of 
this order, which he personally issued verbally 
without any limitation to the entire company, 
that all the Jews in Krutscha without regard to 
sex or age were to be shot. He knew as a master 
sergeant also that the order concerning court 
jurisdiction and the subsequent orders issued to 
the troops regarding the energetic combating of 
partisan activities permitted at most the shooting 
of only those persons who were determined 
to be partisans or their helpers and that this 
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requirement in no way applied to the entire 
Jewish population of Krutscha. It was also clear 
to him that this measure was itself illegal if the 
battalion commander ordered it as retaliation 
for some action known to the defendant because 
it was apparent for him as for anyone that the 
order was illegal since it included the shooting 
of a segment of the enemy population that was 
determined by race and included children of 
all ages. This confirms his admission that he, 
like all platoon leaders and sergeants, was upset 
that the company would be expected to carry 
out such extensive shootings. He had heard 
while on the march into the operational area 
of the extermination actions against the Jewish 
population taken by the SS or SD and considered 
all this a terrible thing. This was even more so as 
his company leader refused to participate in the 
carrying out of the order himself and as one or 
other of the platoon leaders also declared that 
one could not do such a thing. The trial court 
was convinced that defendant Z[imber] also 
recognized that the battalion commander placed 
himself above and beyond the laws of humanity 
when he issued this order and therefore considers 
this action a crime of involuntary manslaughter.
Defendant Z[imber] could not have believed 
that he was allowed to carry out an order that 
he recognized as criminal, one that included the 
killing of innocent children, without coming into 
conflict with the law. Even if he was conditioned 
to obedience during, at the time, his more than 
five years of military service and perhaps was not 
made expressly aware of the provisions of Section 
47 of the Military Penal Code, he nevertheless 
had to have known that even a superior in the 
German military cannot issue orders covering 
every act and situation to subordinates and 
that the obedience of subordinates ends where 
carrying out the order involves a commission 
of a crime. This is especially true for defendant 
Z[imber], who was not a simple soldier but 
had been promoted to sergeant major with 
the rank of master sergeant. He, moreover, has 
such military experience that he could not have 
been in doubt about [the limitations of orders], 
even more so since he was later promoted to 
first lieutenant and was employed after the war 
as a police official [Kriminalsekretär]. Z[imber] 
therefore possessed sufficient intuition and 
intelligence that he had to be so sure of himself, 
that no superior could force him to be complicit 
in carrying out a criminal order. Since he 
nevertheless conducted the action without 
opposition, in the opinion of the trial court, he 
did it for the same or similar reasons that had 
guided the accused N[öll] to issue the order 
for the action to him. In addition defendant 
Z[imber] was perhaps less deeply moved by the 
incident than the accused N[öll] because in a 
letter of March 13, 1954, he called the killings  
“old chestnuts of the war” [alte Kriegskamellen].
Defendant Z[imber] cannot rely on his stated 
fear of punishment as an excuse for what he 
did at that time since for him as well there was 
no extremis due to orders [Befehlsnotstand] 
in the sense of Section 54 of the Penal Code. 
N[öll] had not issued the order in such a way 
that contradiction or counterarguments were 
excluded from the start, nor did he remind 
Z[imber] of his duty to obey nor, using his 
weapon, force him to comply. Thus there was no 
imminent threat to life or limb present. Z[imber] 
had no fear that N[öll] would force him to obey 
using his weapon if he should refuse to carry out 
the order. Considering N[öll]’s own behavior on 
that day, Z[imber] did not even need to fear a 
report of his refusal to obey. Even if he had feared 
such a report, as he now claims, he would not 
have had to fear a court-martial [Kriegsgericht] at 
the time since the order was illegal and he was 
therefore not obligated to carry it out.
Even the fear of punishment—and it could only 
have been here an unjust punishment—does not 
excuse him because the execution of the order 
was not his last resort in the situation at that 
time. Being a longtime soldier, he knew that it 
was not at all necessary that the order be carried 
out the very next day because of the absence of 
any limitations to the order and because of the 
large measure of autonomy the company had 
in implementing orders. Thus there was time 
to consider how to avert carrying out the order 
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or at least consider limitations to the order 
that could be, if necessary, defended at a later 
time. Defendant Z[imber] certainly does not 
make the impression of being a helpless and 
fearful person. If he had not possessed a certain 
degree of intelligence and wit, as well as military 
experience and ability to enforce his views, he 
would certainly not have been promoted to 
company sergeant at the beginning of 1941.
This justifies the assumption that he, too, knew  
of the possibility of presenting counter-
arguments against the order in the appropriated 
military form. He would have had to point 
this out to his superior. Since there were good 
relations between him and N[öll] he knew he 
could have allowed himself that action. He 
also knew that he could bolster his counter-
arguments by establishing just who and how 
many would be affected by the order.
Because of what has been said above, he could 
have pointed out to his commanding officer that 
he could not expect him to undertake actions 
that his commander, as an officer, would not 
undertake himself. As company sergeant major, 
he did not show the same civil courage that 
Private First Class M[agel] and noncommissioned 
officer W. have shown toward him. He cannot 
then claim that he was in an inescapable 
predicament or even that he believed he faced an 
inescapable predicament. An energetic refusal 
by defendant Z[imber] would certainly not 
have been without effect on N[öll], who did 
not exactly make a heroic impression during 
the main proceedings before the trial court, 
and might even have brought him either to 
refuse the assignment now that a second officer 
was on hand (Second Lieutenant Schleper had 
been due to return from deployment) or N[öll] 
could have then presented opposing arguments 
to Commichau. Of course it was likely that 
Commichau would have reacted to N[öll] the 
same way he did to S[ibille], because he was 
characterized by the regimental adjutant, the 
witness Mü., as an idiosyncratic and sometimes 
even arrogant officer. But it is just as possible that 
the protest of two of his company commanders 
could have brought the battalion commander 
to his senses or that the regiment commander 
could have stopped the further shooting of Jews 
based on the report of October 9, 1941, (by Kuhls) 
about the shooting of Jews.
Someone who feels threatened but does not use 
all the means at his disposal to turn away that 
danger cannot then successfully claim that he 
could not possibly have avoided the criminal 
outcome that resulted from that danger.
Also, with regard to the accused Z[imber], 
there is no reason to assume that he wanted the 
killing of the Jews, as ordered by the battalion 
commander, as his own deed. He nevertheless 
intentionally committed, through one and the 
same inherent acts, the crime of accessory to 
involuntary manslaughter of at least 15 persons by 
taking all the measures required to carry out and 
even partially leading the shootings himself.
Sentence
Extenuating circumstances are to be attributed 
to the defendants N[öll] and Z[imber] under 
Section 213 of the Penal Code. Their fate reveals 
a certain tragedy. Since that time they have had 
no criminal record. They both are respectable 
men, who both as professionals and—apart 
from the occurrence that is the subject of these 
proceedings—as soldiers during the war, have 
always done their duty. Their act was neither 
a product of their own inclination nor did it 
derive from a criminal inclination. Neither of 
them would have committed a crime if they had 
not come into this difficult situation, a situation 
for which they were no match in terms of their 
humanity and character. Their guilt is profound, 
but make no mistake, guilt here originated above 
all with the battalion commander who did not 
survive the war and who was the originator of the 
inhuman order. To the credit of the defendants 
weighs also that the partisan war waged by the 
enemy was illegal under international law and 
also necessarily led on the German side to a 
radicalized atmosphere in which the troops were 
more susceptible to excesses of that kind. Further 
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consideration is required because the defendants 
together with their company were deployed 
without the proper equipment and without 
clear instructions. It should be considered as well 
that the orders from the highest leadership were 
contradictory. This is evident in the conflicting 
severe Führer orders and orders from the High 
Command of the Armed Forces on one hand and 
the attempt to weaken these same orders through 
additional orders from the Army High Command 
on the other. Moreover, the military leadership 
failed to the extent that they did not take a clear 
position on the activities of the SD and SS in 
occupied territory and in that they permitted 
their officers to be influenced in the sense of 
such trainings as, for example, the training 
seminar in Mogilev. Finally, to the benefit of the 
defendants is that they committed the criminal 
act with aversion and inner refusal and that they 
in the end only carried out the order because of 
the general fear prevailing at that time that they 
would otherwise arouse the suspicion of being 
members of the political opposition and the 
possible consequences to their person deriving 
from such exposure. This human weakness and 
deficiency does not excuse them, but it puts their 
actions in a milder context. N[öll] obviously 
has severely suffered from this burden. While 
recognizing extenuating circumstances, a jail 
term is appropriate for them, which according to 
the regulation of Section 358, Subsection 2 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure may not surpass the 
sentence pronounced by the original trial court.
The sentence imposed must reflect the serious 
punishment required for the large number, at 
least 15 victims, who lost their lives because of the 
actions of the defendants. Also to be considered 
in this regard is the grievous harm their actions 
had on the reputation and honor of the German 
people. With regard to the defendant N[öll] 
it must be considered to his detriment that 
he pushed responsibility for the execution of 
the order off onto a subordinate in a manner 
unworthy of an officer.
On the other hand, the trial court believed that 
it was required to hand down a criminal penalty 
below that set in the original verdict because 
in the new trial many fewer victims than in 
the first trial were included in the case and 
especially since there was no proof offered that 
children were actually killed, notwithstanding 
that this reduction in the number of victims 
could not be attributed to the actions of the 
defendants. Further, the severity of the penalty 
must also ref lect the extenuating circumstances 
previously cited as requiring a reduction in 
sentence. In addition, in defendant Z[imber]’s 
case, his status as a military subordinate reduces 
his responsibility, meriting a further reduction 
in sentence.
Weighing all circumstances and considering 
the reduction in sentencing permitted under 
Sections 49, Subsection 2, and 44 of the Penal 
Code, the court considers a three-year sentence 
of imprisonment for defendant N[öll] and two 
years for defendant Z[imber] as appropriate  
and just.
The decision on the payment of the court costs 
is based on Sections 465 and 473 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. Since the appeal of the 
defendants was partially successful, as it has led to 
a reduction in penalties, it seems appropriate to 
reduce the fee for appeals for each by a third.
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Appendix D: Acronyms
AO—Area of Operations
AP 1—Protocol Additional to the Geneva  
 Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating  
 to the Protection of Victims of International 
 Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
GC I—Geneva Convention for the Amelioration  
 of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick  
 in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva,  
 12 August 1949.
GC III—Geneva Convention Relative to  
 the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva,  
 12 August 1949.
GC IV—Geneva Convention Relative to the  
 Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.  
 Geneva, 12 August 1949.
HSSPF—Higher SS and Police Leader 
ISAF— International Security Assistance Force
LOAC—Law of Armed Conflict
POW—prisoner of war
rHGM—Army Group Center (rear)
ROE—Rules of Engagement
SD—Sicherheitsdienst (security service)
SECDEF—Secretary of Defense 
SS—Schutzstaffel (protection squadrons)
UCMJ—Uniform Code of Military Justice
Opposite: A German soldier speaks to civilians who 
are crowded on the side of a street, perhaps in Mogilev, 




The suggested activities are designed to be 
adapted as necessary by instructors to fit 
both the time allowed and the subjects to be 
addressed. The questions and approaches are 
designed to address ethical and legal points 
raised by the case study.
pOTENTIAL LEArNING OUTCOmES:
n  Apply and discuss rules of engagement (ROE) 
and the law of armed conflict (LOAC)  
through a historical case study
n  Practice Army Regulation 15-6, Procedures for 
Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers
n  Weave understandings of ethics and law into 
developing leadership styles
rESOUrCES:
n  Case Study
n  The Path to Nazi Genocide: 38-minute film 
produced by the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, available at www.ushmm.org/ 
learn/introduction-to-the-holocaust/path-to-nazi-
genocide
n  The Role of the German Army during the 
Holocaust: five-minute video produced by the 






Three approaches for working with the 
case study follow: Option A addresses Army 
Regulation 15-6; Option B provides a study-
question approach that considers ROE,  
LOAC, and ethical decision-making. Option 
C offers a “peer-to-peer” approach intended 
to enhance communication and fact-finding 
between participants throughout the case study 
experience. Instructors may pick and choose 
elements from the options to suit their goals. 
The approaches invite active participation from 
group members in either small- or whole-group 
discussions. The options take into account 
different time availability and delivery formats.
The authors recommend that participants be 
assigned the Case Study to read in advance, 
regardless of how the instructor intends to 
structure the class. The United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum videos are suitable to be 
viewed either in advance or as part of the class.
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Option A: Army  
regulation 15-6
For this exercise, participants will practice 
the procedure for Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 
by applying information from the historical 
case study to the four key sections of an AR 
15-6 Investigation: Relevant Facts, Standards, 
Findings, and Recommendations. Appendix B 
provides a useful starting point for introducing 
participants to the AR 15-6 process, but service-
specific investigation guidance can be easily 
substituted for it. Implicit in the investigation 
process is determining what and why something 
happened and, in this context, conducting 
analysis by applying legal standards to these facts 
to deduce findings and make recommendations 
to prevent misconduct or mishaps from 
occurring in the future. For participants who are 
cadets or junior officers, they must realize that 
as lieutenants, they will likely find themselves 
tasked with conducting investigations pursuant 
to regulations such as AR 15-6 and that the 
process is used for investigations of both minor 
and very serious matters. Although the conduct 
of AR 15-6 investigations may in fact be the first 
instance in which lieutenants have the quality of 
their work assessed by a field-grade commander, 
it is not a subject with which cadets or junior 
officers ordinarily have much time to familiarize 
themselves during the course of typical military 
instruction. Depending on the nature and the 
pace of the conflict, and the legal status of US 
forces in an AO, commanders will often require 
AR 15-6 investigations into civilian deaths caused 
by US forces. In Afghanistan in 2008–09 for 
example, General David McKiernan required 
not only that investigations be done into all 
US actions that caused civilian deaths, but that 
all other ISAF units do the same. The reports 
were to be forwarded to his headquarters to be 
assessed for potential lessons learned regarding 
civilian deaths and then distributed to the force 
to prevent similar events in the future. Working 
through Option A will introduce participants 
to this important task, using the case study as a 
vehicle for considering a wide range of factors 
and standards that may be applicable in such an 
investigation.
LEArNING OUTCOmES:
n  Participants will discuss the implications of 
the case study while practicing the procedures 
involved with an AR 15-6 investigation.
n  Participants will practice critical thinking 
skills on a concrete task typical of what they 
may be assigned to complete as investigating 
officers.
BACkGrOUND:
AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and 
Boards of Officers (2 October 2006), establishes 
procedures for investigations, including 
“proceedings that involve a single investigating 
officer.”163 “The primary function of any 
investigation... is to ascertain facts, and to report 
them to the appointing authority.. . . It is the duty 
of the investigating officer.. .to ascertain and 
consider the evidence on all sides of each issue, 
thoroughly and impartially, and to make findings 
and recommendations that are warranted by the 
facts and that comply with the instructions of the 
appointing authority.”164
TASk fOr pArTICIpANTS:
Assume you have been appointed as an 
investigating officer to look into the killings of 
Jewish civilians by soldiers of 1st Battalion. You 
are to report back to the appointing authority 
the relevant facts, the standards by which you 
assessed the facts, your findings that result from 
that assessment, and any recommendations on 
how such killings could be prevented in the 
future.
If YOU HAvE ONE HOUr
Have the group complete the reading and watch 
the historical video prior to attending the session. 
Use session time for an instructor-led discussion 
of the following: Relevant Facts, Standards, 
Findings, and Recommendations.
If YOU HAvE TwO HOUrS
Have participants complete reading prior to 
attending the session. Watch the historical 
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video(s) during the session. As a large group, 
discuss Relevant Facts and Standards. Break the 
group into small working groups and have each 
work through Findings and Recommendations. 
Discuss Findings as a large group.
If YOU HAvE THrEE HOUrS
Have participants complete reading prior to 
attending the session. Watch the historical 
video(s) during session. As a large group, discuss 
Relevant Facts and Standards. Break the group 
into small working groups and have each group 
work through Findings and Recommendations. 
Have each group brief the entire class on their 
Findings and Recommendations. End with a 
large-group discussion of the groups’ approaches.
The following are possible responses for the key 
sections considered:
1.  relevant facts 
  Instructors should guide participants through 
the process of determining relevant facts, 
including, although not limited to, the list 
below:
 a.  Nazi dehumanization of Jews
 b.  Lack of partisan activity
 c.  Institutional army history of brutality 
against civilians
 d.  Higher command guidance
 e.   Presence of SS and a mobile killing unit in 
the AO
 f.  Commichau’s direct order, reaffirmed
 g.   Company commander political 
membership; Nazi Party vs. SS 
 h.   Leadership style different among 
company commanders
 i.  Company culture possibly different
 j.   Mogilev Conference, which encouraged 
cooperation between SS and Army; and 
included demonstrations at the tactical 
level, which showed that for higher 
command, “partisan” equals “Jew”
 k.  ROE and implied ROE (Mogilev)
 l.   Company commanders with different 
prior military experience
 m. Sibille suffering no real repercussion
 n.   Sibille’s other moral points on his 
compass, including religion
2.  Standards 
  Instructors should be sure to guide 
participants through discussion of the key 
components of LOAC that form the standards 
against which facts are applied:
 a.   Military Necessity: All force that does not 
violate LOAC is allowed to accomplish the 
mission. Mission accomplishment is not a 
valid reason to violate LOAC.
 b.   Distinction: Distinguish between parties 
taking a direct part in hostilities and 
protected civilians. The United States still 
follows GC III, not AP I, regarding who 
can be a prisoner of war.
 c.   Unnecessary Suffering: No means or 
methods are used that are calculated to 
cause unnecessary injury or pain.
 d.   Proportionality: The commander may use 
force as long as the direct and concrete 
military advantage expected to be gained 
is not outweighed by excessive civilian 
casualties or unnecessary damage to 
civilian property.
 e.  Command Responsibility: Commanders 
must prevent or prosecute violations they 
either knew or should have known were 
occurring.
 f.   Obedience to Orders: Soldiers are not 
required to obey orders that they either 
knew or should have known, based on 
circumstances, to be unlawful.
 g.   Reprisal: Although measured actions 
against protected civilians in response to 
the enemy’s violation of LOAC may have 
once been lawful, it is no longer lawful.
3.  findings 
  Instructors should assist participants in 
applying the standards to the facts to develop 
the findings:
 a.   Military Necessity: No evidence existed 
of a partisan threat in general or that Jews 
in 1st Battalion AO were partisans or had 
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been helping partisans. Shootings of  
Jews, therefore, occurred without military 
necessity.
 b.   Distinction: Jews were targeted as so-
called “racial” enemies, were not taking 
a direct part in hostilities, and were not 
displaying hostile intent or hostile acts.
 c.   Unnecessary Suffering: Jews who were 
rounded up in the square heard the 
screams of those being executed, and 
the marksmanship at the killing site was 
poor, requiring additional shots from 
executioners.
 d.   Proportionality: Because no military 
necessity existed, no direct and concrete 
military advantage would be gained; 
therefore, killing even one civilian would 
have been excessive.
 e.   Command Responsibility: Commichau, 
Kuhls, Nöll, and Zimber knew or should 
have known that killing the Jewish 
civilians was unlawful.
 f.   Obedience to Orders: Each of these 
four leaders should have also known 
that the order was illegal. Sibille sought 
clarification, received reaffirmation of the 
order, and refused to comply. Nöll hoped 
to ignore the order, but once the written 
order was received, he directed Zimber to 
carry it out.
4.  recommendations 
  The instructor will likely need to 
guide participants in formulating their 
recommendations in a structured and logical 
fashion that would be clear to the Appointing 
Officer. Recommendations they identify that 
could play a role in shaping leadership might 
fall within the following areas:
 a.  Mentorship
  (1)  Leadership vs. followership
  (2)   With whom do you form this bond? 
On what basis?
  (3)  What are the elements of mentorship?
  (4)   What are your core values? How do 
your actions reflect your core values?
  (5)   How can the unit best learn from 
noncommissioned officers (NCOs)?
 b. Education
  (1)   Good vs. bad role models— 
whom do you study, and why?  
Does a mix work best?
  (2)   Holism—can you integrate ethics, 
morals, leadership, law, and history?
 c.  Discipline
  (1)   How is discipline enforced?  
What is tolerated?
  (2)  Legal discipline vs. moral discipline
 d.  Training
  (1)  Who conducts the training?
  (2)   Are you, as a commander, conducting 
the training, or are you defaulting  
to a judge advocate?165
 e.  Exercises
  (1)  How are they structured?
  (2)   Do you use role players? How good are 
they?
  (3)   Do situational training exercises push 
the edge in developing judgment  
in complex situations?
 f.  Command Climate
  (1)  How well do you understand the life 
experiences of your NCOs?
  (2)  How does your commander interact 
with you and your peers?
  (3)  How do your soldiers perceive what 
you really care about and what is not  
as great a priority (“expect what you 
inspect”)?
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Option B: Study Questions
The study questions that follow are samples 
that relate to the lesson and can be modified as 
instructors deem appropriate for their classes. 
Instructors can tailor the number of questions 
selected and the use of small groups to fit the 
allotted timeframe.
LEArNING OUTCOmES:
n  Participants, through the lens of the 
historical case study, examine and discuss the 
application of ROE, LOAC, and sources of 
ethical decision-making for leaders.
n  Participants understand how history, ethics, 
law, and military tactics relate to each other in 
an operational setting.
BACkGrOUND:
The study questions delve into concepts relevant 
for today. Engaging in the questions in a group 
environment enables participants to hear 
different perspectives as they develop and refine 
their own approaches to leadership. 
 
TASk fOr pArTICIpANTS: 
In this environment, participants are tasked with 
reflecting on and responding to the prompts so 
as to deepen their understandings of the concepts 
at hand.
Depending upon course requirements and time 
available, instructors may want to specify certain 
study questions for participants to consider as 
they complete the reading in preparation for 
discussion. Instructors may also wish to assign 
different questions to different small study 
groups for them to discuss and brief back to the 
larger group. 
1.  Define and explain:
 a.  Proportionality
 b.  Distinction
 c.  Avoiding Unnecessary Suffering
 d.  Military Necessity
2.   Apply each of the four principles to a 
specific example from the actions of rHGM 
troops in Belarus in the fall of 1941. Consider 
the context of a 1st Battalion company 
commander, and contrast and compare that 
perspective with what you would expect of 
yourself as a US military professional.
 a.  proportionality 
   The concrete and direct military 
advantage to be gained, in the 
commander’s view, seemed to be that 
killing Jewish civilians would hamper 
partisan activities in the battalion AO. 
Not only were civilians directly targeted 
for execution, but there was no indication 
that these individuals were actually 
acting as or assisting partisans; therefore, 
executing these civilians yielded no 
military advantage. Even had these been 
incidental deaths, which they were not, 
the loss of civilian life was excessive 
compared to the anticipated military 
advantage.
 b.  Distinction 
   No evidence existed to suggest that the 
Jewish civilians rounded up and shot 
by the 3rd Company soldiers had taken 
part in hostilities; they therefore were 
not combatants. Even if they had been 
identified as combatants, they should have 
been detained under these circumstances 
rather than summarily executed. The 
United States, as a matter of policy, 
ordinarily treats captured partisans as 
enemy prisoners of war (POWs). 
 c.  Avoiding Unnecessary Suffering 
   This principle is not applicable in the 
strict sense, but participants may present 
the argument that holding the Jews near 
the execution site where they could hear 
the shots and screams was inhumane.
 d.  military Necessity 
   Even if the evidence had demonstrated 
that some Jewish civilians were assisting 
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the partisans, as long as they were not 
taking a direct part in hostilities, they 
could not be targeted as combatants but 
could perhaps be detained as security 
threats. Shooting of civilians is unlawful 
and, therefore, not excused under the 
principle of military necessity.
3.   Define and explain the legal standards for 
command responsibility and obedience to 
orders.
4.   If there are any defenses for failing to meet 
the standards of command responsibility and 
obedience to orders, what are they?
  Command responsibility is not a strict 
liability concept. If a commander could show 
that he did not know and should not have 
been expected under the circumstances to 
know, then he will not be responsible for his 
subordinates’ violations of LOAC.
  Similarly, if a subordinate can show that he 
did not know an order was illegal and that 
it was not manifestly illegal, he could have 
a valid defense to a law of war violation. 
Certain offenses, however, are so patently 
illegal that this defense will not be available in 
all circumstances, such as with genocide and 
crimes against humanity.
5.   Identify successes and failures to meet the 
standard of command responsibility in the 
actions of rHGM troops in the fall of 1941. 
Discuss the repercussions that did or did 
not follow from the decisions of the 1st 
Battalion company commanders to follow 
Commichau’s order.
  At the battalion level and below, Commichau, 
Kuhls, and Nöll were responsible for the 
acts committed by their soldiers against 
the Jewish civilians. Although he was not 
an officer, Zimber was also guilty, given his 
responsibilities. Sibille conducted himself 
properly. At the higher levels, the brigade 
and division commanders, as well as General 
von Schenckendorf, could likely be found 
criminally responsible.
6.   Identify successes and failures to meet the 
standard of obedience to orders in the actions 
of rHGM troops in the fall of 1941.
  Only Sibille met the standard. Concerned 
about the propriety of the orders, he went 
directly to his commander for clarification. 
Despite receiving further direction to follow 
the original order, he refused. His basis for 
refusal was not primarily that the order was 
illegal; rather, refusal seems to have been 
a moral choice for him. Nöll initially did 
not intend to obey the order but did not 
question it once it was confirmed in writing. 
Kuhls apparently obeyed the order without 
question.
7.  What are ROE?
  ROE are constraints on the latitude exercised 
by commanders and soldiers regarding the 
use of force and employment of forces in 
accomplishing their missions.
8.   What are the differences between ROE  
and LOAC?
  ROE can be more restrictive on the use 
of force than LOAC would allow and also 
address political, diplomatic, and military 
coordination, and materiel stewardship, in 
addition to ensuring conformance with  
legal requirements.
9.   What are the sources and content of your 
leadership values?
 a.  Officer’s Oath, training
 b.   Institutional organizational culture. 
Discuss organizational conduct that has 
occurred in the US armed forces, such as 
detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, instructor 
misconduct at Aberdeen, the “kill squad” 
murders in Afghanistan, or the Iron 
Triangle killings and Haditha in Iraq.
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 c.  Sports teams
 d.  Social clubs
 e.  Religious education
 f.  Philosophy/ideals
 g.  Peers/parents
 h.  Experience
10.  Contrast the origin and content of the values 
of Kuhls with those of Sibille. What are the 
differences, what are the similarities, and how 
do they compare with yours?
  Although both men held Nazi Party 
membership before the war, Kuhls was the 
more radical antisemite. Sibille was also 
a religious man, whereas Kuhls was anti-
religious. Further, Sibille’s perspectives were 
informed by his prior service on the western 
front in World War I; so, too, were Nöll’s. 
Interestingly, both were teachers. What are 
the specific sources of your values, and what 
do you believe or value that would have 
mattered had you been ordered to execute 
civilians?
11.   What possible factors led to the slaughter  
of Jewish civilians by rHGM troops in the fall 
of 1941?
 1.   Eight years of accelerating 
dehumanization of Jews in German 
society
 2.   The influence of the Nazi Party political 
program over all aspects of German life
 3.  Newly formed unit, weak leadership
 4.   Prior “soft” duty of the western front  
vs. the brutality of the eastern front
 5.   Promotion of a “war of annihilation” 
context by both the Nazi Party and 
Germany
 6.   Wrapping genocide in the blanket of 
antipartisan action
 7.   From a US perspective, a values system 
inconsistent with the principles of  
LOAC and constitutional protection  
of expression, religion, and ethnicity
 8.  A desire to please one’s commander
 9.   A laziness or lack of moral compass, 
demonstrated by taking the easy wrong 
over the difficult right
 10.  Being a rule follower no matter how 
ridiculous the rule; obedience to orders
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Option C: peer-to-peer 
(p2p) format
Today’s young military professionals exchange 
information with each other and learn about 
their environments through social media. The 
flattened hierarchy of this style of interaction 
is complemented by almost boundless 
and immediate access to information and 
perspectives, with few if any hierarchical filters. 
The instructor’s role in such an environment 
is very different than that in traditional ethical 
and legal education and training—given a task, 
conditions, and standards, the participants 
teach each other both within their immediate 
discussion groups and in the greater discussion 
group as a whole. Although this model has been 
demonstrated to be useful for developing a 
better understanding of leadership ethics and 
values for military professionals in general, it 
particularly provides an environment beneficial 
for considering the challenges of leadership and 
conflict in a cyber environment.166 
This option creates an environment in which  
military professionals engage in interactive  
discussions that emphasize high levels of  
simultaneous communication between  
participants during the lesson. Additionally,  
the format provides the ability to learn and act  
as a group to solve complex problems, permits  
an arena for those often quiet in instructor- 
led environments to speak out, and models  
an environment in which immediate access  
to multidisciplinary information drives  
decision-making. 
This option works well if you can combine 
sections or convene multiple groups that are 
studying this case. In field testing, this format  
has been used successfully with groups as large  
as 85 students at one time, in one location. 
LEArNING OUTCOmES:
n  When P2P is used in conjunction with Option 
A or Option B, corresponding Learning  
Outcomes apply. 
n  Participants simulate a “real-world” 
environment in which they must base their 
decision on information gathered from the 
field.  
BACkGrOUND:
This example uses Option A as a foundation. 
Tasking for participants can be tweaked (using 
Option B, for example) while still applying the 
P2P approach. 
TASk fOr pArTICIpANTS:
They are appointed to conduct an investigation 
into the circumstances of the execution order 
given by the 1st Battalion commander. They are to 
report back to the entire group their assessments 
of the causes for the different reactions by the 
company commanders to the illegal order, 
potential moral and legal culpability, and 
recommendations for preventing such atrocities 
in the future.
This approach requires a total of three hours.  
The first hour, ideally given earlier in the day  
or week so that the students can reflect upon 
the content, provides the historical background 
of the case study. The capstone exercise portion 
takes two hours. 
HOUr ONE
Provide a historical foundation via lecture, 
film, and/or readings (see previous options for 
guidance). This segment is done in a traditional 
format.
HOUrS TwO AND THrEE: p2p
first Hour: Participants convene in groups of 
four to eight to answer the questions required 
to complete the AR 15-6 investigation. As 
groups, they must identify the relevant facts; 
the applicable ethical, legal, moral, and military 
standards to apply to the facts; the findings they 
derive from the application of the standards 
to the facts such as ethical, moral, and legal 
culpability; and their recommendations for 
action at the small-unit level to prevent atrocities 
like this in the future. Each group appoints a 
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scribe and a spokesperson to record the results  
of their discussions.
Second Hour: “Briefing by exception” during which 
groups present the outcomes of their group’s 
discussion to the entire group. In the briefing-
by-exception format, groups focus on raising 
new points rather than repeating already-shared 
details. The moderator performs the important 
task of ensuring that the briefing moves along 
at a swift pace while clarifying and emphasizing 
points raised by the successive spokespersons 
for the groups. If technology is available, 
representatives from each group should type 
up results that can then be projected on a large 
screen when reporting out. 
wrap-Up: The capstone can be concluded 
successfully in various ways. For example, the 
instructor can identify two students in advance to 
be thinking about the “so what?” of this exercise. 
The session can end with them articulating 
these observations for final comments and 
reflections. Or, the moderator could identify 
the most important themes brought forth in the 
discussions and briefings and emphasize them to 
the students. 
Additionally, as a means to mirror contemporary 
communication environments, smart devices and 
social media technology can be incorporated to 
augment the lesson in the following ways:
 Hour One: Historical presentation
	 n  If there will be a significant amount of time 
between the historical presentation and the 
P2P session, the moderator can send tweets 
to the students to ask them to consider 
certain issues raised by the case study.
 p2p first hour
 n  Video teleconferencing can be used to 
bring in remotely located experts or 
military leaders. 
 n  Websites containing video interviews and 
written resources on leadership, ethics, 
history, and legal matters can be accessed by 
students after the historical presentation to 
deepen understandings.
 n  Participants can use their smartphones 
during the small group sessions to send 
and receive tweets between groups about 
important points raised at their tables 
(accelerating the normalizing of the whole 
group’s information). 
 n  Appointed scribes can blog about their 
table’s progress and results in real time. 
 p2p second hour
 n  Audience survey techniques can be used 
to quickly assess whether participants 
understood key facts and important points 
of the lesson.
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documentation, study, and interpretation of Holocaust history, and serves as its memorial to the 
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million were murdered; Roma and Sinti (Gypsies), people with mental and physical disabilities, and 
Poles were also targeted for destruction or decimation for racial, ethnic, or national reasons. Millions 
more, including homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Soviet prisoners of war, and political dissidents,  
also suffered grievous oppression and death under Nazi Germany. 
A living memorial to the Holocaust, the Museum strives to inspire leaders and citizens to confront 
hatred, prevent genocide, and promote human dignity. Its primary mission is to advance and 
disseminate knowledge about this unprecedented tragedy, to preserve the memory of those who 
suffered, and to encourage all people to reflect upon the moral and spiritual questions raised by  
the events of the Holocaust as well as their own responsibilities as citizens of a democracy. 
For more information, visit ushmm.org.
The Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies (CHGS) at west point educates current and  
future military leaders about genocide and mass atrocity and inspires them to the cause of prevention.  
A privately supported endeavor, the CHGS is the only center of its kind at the service academies. It 
operates as an inter-service hub, linking all branches of the military with civilian academic institutions 
and nongovernmental entities to promote research, interdisciplinary curricular innovation, and 
common programming for the development of military leaders. Thus, the center acts as a creator and 
facilitator, serving as a key resource for the Department of Defense as the nation seeks to find better 
means of detecting and preventing mass atrocity.
For more information, visit usma.edu/chgs/Sitepages/Home.aspx.
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